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ESSAY
AL CAPONE'S REVENGE: AN ESSAY ON THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PRETEXTUAL PROSECUTION
Daniel C. Richman* & Williamj Stuntz**
Most analyses of pretextual prosecutions-cases in which prosecutors
target defendants based on suspicion of one crime but prosecute them for
another, lesser crime-focus on the defendant's interest in fair treatment.
Far too little attention is given to the strong social interest in non-pretextual
prosecutions. Chargingcriminals with their "true" crimes makes criminal
law enforcement more transparent,and hence more politically accountable.
It probably also facilitates deterrence. Meanwhile, prosecutorialstrategies of
the sort used to "get" Al Capone can create serious credibility problems. The
Justice Department has struggled with those problems as it has used Caponestyle strategies against suspected terrorists. That is no surprise: Pretextual
charging is primarily a phenomenon of the federal criminal justice system,
where law enforcers are less politically accountable than in state justice systems. The solution is to make the federaljustice system more accountable. A
variety offorces are pushingin that direction;federal courts could help speed
the process along with appropriatejurisdiction and statutory interpretation
doctrines. If those things happen, pretext cases will become less common, and
the justice system will be healthier.
INTRODUCTION

In 1931, Al Capone was the leading mobster in Chicago. He had
violated the Volstead Act on a massive scale, bribed a large fraction of
Chicago officialdom, and murdered various criminal competitors. Because he was America's first celebrity criminal, all this was clear to much
of the nation, not just to Chicagoans. But his crimes were not easily
proved in court. So federal prosecutors charged Capone not with running illegal breweries or selling whiskey or even slaughtering rival mobsters, but with failure to pay his income taxes. Capone was incredulous.
When he heard about the tax charge, he reportedly called it "a lot of
bunk," adding: "The government can't collect legal taxes from illegal
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money."' Actually, it could. So he was convicted and packed off to a
2
federal penitentiary, where he died thirteen years later.
Ever since, Al Capone has been the poster child for pretextual prosecution. It is common in the United States and especially common in the
federal justice system for law enforcers to go after a criminal defendant
because they suspect him of one crime (or, as in Capone's case, a set of
crimes) and then to charge and convict him of a different crime, unrelated to and less severe than the first. That practice has generated a standard debate, and the debate has a standard resolution. The defendant
claims the government is behaving arbitrarily, singling him out for different treatment than that which others receive.3 "Pretext" is a dirty word; it
connotes something shady and underhanded. The government responds
that nonpayment of income taxes (or false statements, or mail fraud, or
whatever the charged offense) is a legitimate crime, something for which
any ordinary citizen might be prosecuted and punished if guilty. Surely
the Al Capones of the world should not be immune from punishment for
the small crimes they commit by virtue of their larger crimes. That government response almost always wins in court, 4 and that resolution is gen1. The quote appears in a host of sources; for recent examples on three continents,
see Anniversaries, Times (London), Jan. 17, 2003, at 38; Avoiding Taxes Is as American as
Apple Pie, Bait. Sun, July 4, 2004, at 5D; Mati Wagner, Gov't Takes Aim at Black Market,
Jerusalem Post, Dec. 19, 2003, at 13.
2. For the best accounts of Capone's exploits and the government's surprising means
of putting a stop to them, see generally Laurence Bergreen, Capone: The Man and the
Era (1994); John Kobler, Capone: The Life and World of Al Capone (1971). Even in
1931, there were precedents for Capone's prosecution. A bootlegger named Manley
Sullivan took his case to the Supreme Court, which decided in 1927 that the privilege
against self-incrimination did not entitle him to decline to file an income tax return on the
ground that all his income was from illegal sources. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259,
263-64 (1927) ("It would be an extreme if not an extravagant application of the Fifth
Amendment to say that it authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income
because it had been made in crime."). Closer to home, Al's brother Ralph was convicted
in 1929 on tax charges. Bergreen, supra, at 363-65.
3. The leading case addressing this argument is Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985). Wayte is not exactly a pretext case, though it's close. The defendant, along with
674,000 other young men, had illegally failed to register for the draft. But he had done
something else: Repeatedly, the defendant wrote the Justice Department letters
announcing that he would never register and daring them to prosecute him. See id. at 601
n.2, 604. Eventually, they obliged-whereupon the defendant claimed he was being
prosecuted for writing the letters, not for failing to register. Id. at 603-04. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument. Id. at 607-14.
4. Again, in doctrinal terms the leading case is Wayte. See supra note 3. More
conventional pretext claims appear in, for example, United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264,
271-72 (9th Cir. 1970), where the defendant claimed his prosecution for violating the
alien registration statute was motivated by his organized crime associations. See also
United States v. Trent, 718 F. Supp. 39, 39 (D. Or. 1989) (defendant claimed his drug
prosecution was motivated by his gang associations); People v. Mantel, 388 N.Y.S.2d 565,
566 (1976) (defendant charged with building code violations claimed government had
singled out proprietors of "sex shops"); 4 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure
§ 13.4(c) (1999) (discussing pretextual prosecution and deferential "rational relationship"
standard applied by the courts).
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erally tolerated in the academic literature as well. 5 Pretextual prosecutions are a widely accepted feature of our criminal justice system, and
they are widely, albeit not universally, understood to be both legally and
ethically permissible.
Notice that this standard debate assumes that only one person has a
legitimate interest in charging and convicting Capone for the crimes that
actually motivated his prosecution and not for something else: Capone.
The argument against pretextual prosecution-the argument for what
one might call "truth in charging"-is based entirely on protecting defendants' interests. Or so we generally assume.
The assumption is wrong. There is a strong social interest in nonpretextual prosecution, and that interest is much more important than
the "fairness to defendants" argument that has preoccupied the literature
on this subject. Criminal charges are not only a means of identifying and
punishing criminal conduct. They are also a means by which prosecutors
send signals to their superiors, including the voters to whom they are
ultimately responsible. When a murderer is brought to justice for murder rather than for tax evasion, voters learn some important things about
An analogous issue arises with respect to pretextual searches. Imagine that a police
officer has probable cause to believe the defendant has committed a traffic offense but
wishes to investigate a drug crime. May the officer use her suspicion of the traffic violation
to justify a search for drugs? The basic answer is yes: Arrests are permissible even for
minor crimes, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) ("If an officer has
probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal
offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender."), and searches incident to arrest are permissible whenever the arrest is
permissible. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). The officer's
subjective intent (i.e., the fact that the reason for the search differs from its legal
justification) is irrelevant. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996) ("[0] nly
an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior
motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to
believe that a violation of law has occurred."). There is a slight limit: Under Knowles v.
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998), officers may not conduct searches incident to arrest before
actually arresting the suspect-meaning that an officer may not stop a motorist for
speeding, write out a ticket, then search the motorist's car for drugs before allowing him to
go on his way. On the other hand, that scenario is perfectly constitutional with a slight
alteration: If the officer first says, "You're under arrest" (for the traffic offense) and then
searches the car, she is home free. If no drugs are found, the officer may simply say, "I
changed my mind; you're free to go now." If drugs are found, the defendant may then be
arrested on the drug charge.
5. The tolerance consists of a grudging silence; extended treatments of the issue are
rare. For a recent exception, see Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 Geo. L.J. 1135
(2004). The one area in the literature where pretext is not tolerated is when it is
associated with racial profiling-even in the absence of provable unconstitutional
motivation. For good discussions, see generally Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the
Law (1997) (criticizing influence of race in pretextual arrests); Pamela S. Karlan, Race,
Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2001 (1998) (describing
and criticizing failure of Constitution to preclude pervasive use of racial profiling in
pretextual highway stops); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:
Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 605 (1998) (same).
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their community and about the justice system: that a given homicide has
been committed in a particular way (if a criminal organization is involved, they may learn things about how the organization works and what
kind of people comprise it); that the crime has been solved; that the police and prosecution have done a good job of assembling evidence
against the killer, and so forth. If there is a legislative body that oversees
the relevant law enforcement agencies, those same signals are sent to the
legislative overseers. When a prosecutor gets a conviction-usually by inducing a guilty plea-for an unrelated lesser crime than the one that
motivated the investigation, the signals are muddied. They may disappear altogether. Sometimes, there are alternative sources of information:
Voters already knew who Capone was and what he did. But for most
crimes and most criminals, even famous ones, those alternative sources
do not exist.
Another audience also gets a muddied signal: would-be criminals.
Instead of sending the message that running illegal breweries and bribing
local cops would lead to a term in a federal penitentiary, the Capone
prosecution sent a much more complicated and much less helpful message: If you run a criminal enterprise, you should keep your name out of
the newspapers and at least pretend to pay your taxes.
In short, criminal litigation is not just a means of rationing criminal
punishment. It is also a source of productive signals and valuable information. As a number of scholars have noted, criminal law has a "social
meaning" 6-but the law's messages are filtered through prosecutors' liti7
gation choices, and those choices can change the message dramatically.
In the case of most pretextual prosecutions, the change is for the worse.
Such prosecutions may lead criminals to underestimate the price of their
crimes; they may also make it harder for voters and legislative oversight
committees to trust the good information that comes from other, nonpretextual criminal cases. To a much greater extent than the literature
has recognized, the political economy of criminal law enforcement depends on a reasonably good match between the charges that motivate
prosecution and the charges that appear on defendants' rap sheets.
When crimes and charges do not coincide, no one can tell whether law
enforcers are doing their jobs. The justice system loses the credibility it
6. The leading articles in this vein are Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of
Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413 (1999), and Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1997). For an interesting discussion of the
implications of work such as Kahan's for criminal law scholarship, see Bernard E.
Harcourt, After the "Social Meaning Turn": Implications for Research Design and
Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 Law & Soc'y Rev. 179,
186-97 (2000). For a sharply critical analysis of this literature and of Kahan's work in
particular, see Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law
Scholarship, 93 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 467, 470 (2003).
7. For a more extended discussion of this point, see William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 520-23 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Pathological Politics].
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needs, and voters lose the trust they need to have in the justice system.
Individual agents and prosecutors pay only a tiny fraction of that price,
which is why they continue to follow the Capone strategy. The larger
price is paid only over time-by crime victims, by law enforcement agencies, and (not least) by the voting public. Somewhere, Big Al must be
smiling.
Interestingly, local police agencies and district attorneys' offices tend
to be a good deal more wary of paying that price than are federal agents
and prosecutors. They operate in a world in which (for the most part) it
is clear when a crime has occurred, what that crime is, and who (if anyone) will be responsible for pursuing it. Federal prosecutors have not
had to live in such a world. Consequently, pretextual prosecutions are, at
least in part, a federalism problem. And they are becoming a terrorism
problem. The Justice Department, including the FBI and the many
United States Attorneys' offices, is chiefly responsible for fighting the domestic portion of the War on Terror. And the Justice Department has
invoked Al Capone's name frequently in that war, as it prosecutes terror
suspects with any available criminal charge. Yet the strategy has left the
Justice Department in a quandary. It would like to detail its successes by
telling of the terrorists it has put away. But having never offered proof
that those it has charged with immigration-related and other such offenses are really terrorists, the Justice Department lacks any external validation of its claimed success. Without any adjudication of a terrorist connection, ipse dixit is not enough.
The solution is not to abandon pretextual charging in terrorism
cases; there may be no realistic alternative. But where there are alternatives, the law should give prosecutors incentives to avoid strategic charging practices. That would make federal criminal justice both more transparent and more politically accountable. It would also, over time, give
federal officials the public credibility they need as they fight the War on
Terror.
The balance of this Essay is organized as follows. Part I reviews the
conventional debate about pretextual prosecutions. By the terms of that
debate, this strategy is both sensible and fair. Part II then explores the
connection between pretextual prosecution and federalism-why it is
that local prosecutors seem to care more about the signals their cases
send than do their federal counterparts. One lesson of this discussion is
that the political economy of local criminal law enforcement is healthier
than is sometimes thought. Federal criminal law enforcement is the
problem; political constraints that rein in local prosecutors are much
weaker in the federal system. Part III turns to terrorism, where the costs
to the government of the Capone strategy have become both large and
salient in recent months. Part IV returns to federalism, and explores
some ways in which pretextual prosecution might be better controlled.
There is some reason to believe the system is already moving in productive directions. Federal courts could help that process along, with more
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sensible statutory interpretation doctrines in criminal cases-and by paying less attention to the fine points ofjurisdictional elements. Ironically,
a sensible criminal justice federalism is more likely to occur if the federal
courts do not try to mandate it.
I.

THE PRETEXT PROBLEM

Consider four characteristics of Capone's prosecution. First, the government came across evidence of a less serious crime while investigating
more serious crimes. Second, the crime charged-tax evasion-is of a
sort that requires some enforcement, but not much; the ratio of violations to prosecutions is bound to be high. Third, this lesser criminal
charge was easier to prove than the more serious offenses that initially
motivated the investigation. The fourth characteristic seems unrelated to
the others, though in practice it often appears in pretext cases: Capone
was a celebrity.
Capone's case did not prompt much public criticism, but other,
more recent examples of this strategy have drawn more negative reactions. Think of Bill Clinton's impeachment and the investigation that led
to it, or Martha Stewart's prosecution and conviction for false statements
to federal investigators. Those cases also had the four characteristics just
described. Clinton's perjury and obstruction of justice were a detour
from a long-running investigation of ordinary white-collar fraud. 8 Investigators caught Stewart in the lies for which she was convicted while investigating possible insider trading. 9 Perjury, obstruction, and false statements10 are all crimes that, like tax evasion, must be pursued
occasionally. But only occasionally: For all of these offenses, the ratio of
violations to prosecutions is very high. Likewise, these crimes are more
easily proved than the more complex white-collar crimes that initially motivated the Clinton and Stewart investigations. (Banking and securities
fraud cases rarely rest on evidence as strong as the famous blue dress.)
Like Capone before them, both Clinton and Stewart were nationally
known before they were the targets of criminal investigations, and their
fame seemed to play a large role in the process that led to their
prosecutions."
8. Richard Posner's book tells the story well. See Richard A. Posner, An Affair of
State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton 16-31 (1999).
9. See Constance L. Hays, Martha Stewart Indicted by U.S. on Obstruction, N.Y.
Times, June 5, 2003, at Al.
10. Clinton was investigated and impeached for a combination of perjury and
obstruction ofjustice. Stewart was convicted of violating the federal false statements statute
and obstruction of justice.
. 11. On Clinton, see, for example, James B. Stewart, Blood Sport: The President and
His Adversaries 41-179 (1996). Although Stewart's account was written well before the
Lewinsky story broke, it captures the fervor of the people trying to take Clinton down.
According to the conservative press, a similar fervor gripped the federal officials who
pursued Martha Stewart. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Editorial, Justice Tries to Give
Herself a Black Eye, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 2004, at A17 (noting that federal prosecutors
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What is it about these cases that attracts so much criticism? Take the
four listed characteristics in turn. First, law enforcers found evidence of a
minor crime while looking for evidence of a major one. Michelin travel
guides label some destinations "worth a trip"; others only "worth a detour." 12 People who work in prosecutors' offices and police agencies
often draw a similar line. The list of crimes worth ginning up an investigation is fairly small; the number of crimes worth pursuing if discovered
in the course of some other investigation is a good deal larger. This
sounds fishy: If the minor crime wasn't worth initiating an investigation,
why is it worth enforcing at all? Yet there is not necessarily anything untoward about enforcing some crimes in this way. "Detour" investigations
are cheaper and likely to have a higher success rate than freestanding
investigations. And by definition, detours involve suspects who may well
be guilty of other crimes, so the risk of injustice is lower than in freestanding investigations: Whatever the odds were that Capone was innocent of
the tax charge, the odds that he was both innocent of that charge and
innocent of the crimes that first prompted his investigation must have
been vanishingly small. Not a bad formula for enforcing marginal but
necessary criminal prohibitions.
Which leads to the second feature of pretext cases. Plainly, tax evasion, perjury, false statements, and obstruction of justice-the crimes
prosecuted in the Capone and Stewart cases and the crimes for which Bill
Clinton was impeached-cannot be enforced across the board. Budget
constraints do not allow for widespread enforcement. Were it otherwise,
tens of thousands of civil lawsuits each year would produce perjury prosecutions (Clinton is far from the only civil litigant who shaded the truth in
a deposition), and tax cheats would fill the federal prisons. Equally
plainly, such crimes should not be left entirely unenforced. As much dishonesty as our tax and litigation systems have now, they would surely have
a good deal more if neither litigants nor lawyers feared criminal sanctions
for their lies.
This in-between quality-not like homicide or armed robbery, yet
also unlike tearing the tag off a mattress or drawing counterfeit "Woodsy
pursued Stewart because her "tabloid notoriety" ensured that "multiple parties [found]
careerist value in picking on her"); Paul Craig Roberts, Editorial, Judicial System Casualty,
Wash. Times, Mar. 12, 2004, at A21 (describing indictment, trial, and conviction of Stewart
as "Kafkaesque" and "political persecution"); Alan Reynolds, Obstructing Injustice: The
Stewart Chase, Nat'l Rev. Online, June 24, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/comment-reynolds062403.asp
(on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(maintaining that charging Stewart with making false statements seemed "more like a
desperate way for her original accusers to save face than a serious effort to protect any real
people from any real crimes"); cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart?:
Observations About Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 Tex. J. Women &
L. 247, 251 (2003) (suggesting that Stewart might have been singled out because she is "a
very visible and controversial female public figure with political interests adverse to those
of the Bush administration").
12. See, e.g., Michelin Travel Publications, The Green Guide to Sicily 2 (2d ed. 2001).
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Owls"' 3-means that enforcing laws like the ones listed in the preceding
paragraph requires a selection mechanism, some tool for separating the
few cases where prosecution is appropriate from the many where it isn't.
Random enforcement is a practical impossibility. It would mean, in practice, random investigation, and the large majority of investigations would
yield no charge. Unless we are to have massive increases in law enforcement budgets, that level of inefficiency is intolerable. An obvious and
obviously attractive alternative is to enforce such crimes when investigators find violations in the course of sniffing out other, more serious
crimes. This too sounds fishy, as though the government were playing
bait-and-switch with criminal punishment. But the "switch" is generally
unplanned-no one thought about Lewinsky when the Whitewater investigation was gearing up, nor was Capone initially targeted because of his
tax liability. And again, the practice of prosecuting some crimes only or
primarily against defendants suspected of other, more serious crimes
tends to minimize the worst injustices.
The third key feature of pretext cases goes to proof. Capone's tax
evasion was easier to prove than his liquor violations (even though everyone knew about the latter). Martha Stewart's lies were more readily established than her (alleged) insider trading. And Bill Clinton's guilt was
much more easily established with respect to perjury and obstructionthe "detour" crimes-than with respect to the Whitewater-based frauds
that had been Starr's primary focus. Of course, proving guilt is what prosecutors are supposed to do. If there is a danger here, it is that the easily
proved crimes were not serious enough tojustify criminal punishment. If
that is so, then the government is substituting an easily proved fake
"crime" for a harder-to-prove real one.
The risk is both real and important, but it should not be overstated.
The likelihood that a prosecutor will make too much of a minor crime
may be particularly great when the prosecutor has only one case on her
docket-an unfortunate characteristic of the old independent counsel
model. 14 Even there, the Clinton case suggests that there is some protection against the risk of criminal punishment based on trumped-up technicalities. Not only did the Senate acquit; experienced lawyers testified during the House impeachment hearings that no factually similar case could
possibly yield a conviction-indeed, that no such case would be brought
13. These are the two most famously innocuous federal crimes. For the "Woodsy
Owl" statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 711a (2000) (banning manufacture, use, or reproduction of
the character or of the associated slogan: "Give a Hoot, Don't Pollute"). The requirement
that sellers (note: not everyone) leave mattress tags intact stems from several provisions of
the United States Code and federal regulations. For a detailed analysis and defense of that
rule, see Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533,
1610-14 & n.264 (1997).
14. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr. & Daniel C. Richman, Of Prosecutors and Special
Prosecutors: An Organizational Perspective, 5 Widener L. Symp. J. 79, 83-84 (2000).
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for prosecution. t5 If that conclusion is correct, the worst pretext cases
may be self-deterring: Prosecutors do not prosecute because juries would
not convict if given the chance. And in the rare cases where deterrence
fails, prosecutors may pay a steep price. Starr's reputation was severely
damaged by his investigation of the Lewinsky affair,1 6 and Donald Smaltz
did himself no favors by hounding Mike Espy over his receipt of Super
Bowl tickets from lobbyists-another independent counsel investigation
that led to an acquittal. 1 7 Starr's and Smaltz's travails suggest that the
odds of conviction and punishment on trivial charges may be smaller
than is usually thought. Meanwhile, the severity of that risk-the degree
of overpunishment when the prosecution wins-is mitigated by the existence of the background crime: Again, in all the cases mentioned above,
investigators suspected the target of other, more serious offenses than
those charged. That suspicion may have been unjustified in Clinton's
case-or in Stewart's (although surely not in Capone's). Still, the presence of suspicion means something.
15. After exploring the various gradations of perjury, Alan Dershowitz testified that
"the false statements of which President Clinton is accused fall at the most marginal end of
the least culpable genre of this continuum of offenses and would never even be considered
for prosecution in the routine cases involving an ordinary defendant." Consequences of
Perjury and Related Crimes: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 85 (1998) (statement of Alan M. Dershowitz, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School). In the same hearing, Jeffrey Rosen testified that "neither the
independent counsel nor anyone else, to my knowledge, has been able to identify a case
where a defendant was prosecuted, let alone convicted, for peripheral statements in a civil
proceeding." Id. at 97 (statement of Jeffrey Rosen, Associate Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School). If Dershowitz and Rosen are correct, and we know of
no reason to believe otherwise, then either prosecutors have shown remarkable restraint or
juries are unwilling to convict on such charges.
Juries are not alone in their skepticism of inflated charges for marginal misconduct;
appellate courts may be as skeptical, or nearly so. For a good example of such judicial
skepticism in action, see United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 406-07
(1999) (expressing worry that allowing charges to be brought under a broad reading of the
"illegal gratuity statute" might result in criminalization of innocuous behavior).
16. The Gallup Organization commented that Starr
le[ft] the office as one of the most negatively evaluated public figures measured
in Gallup Poll annals. About two-thirds of Americans said they had a negative
opinion of Starr earlier [in 1999], after the impeachment crisis was over, and the
same number said they disapproved of the job he did as independent counsel.
Other measures taken during 1998 and early 1999 show the degree to which the
American public distrusted both his motives and his decisions.
Frank Newport, The Gallup Organization, Abstract, Starr's Tenure as Independent
Counsel Marked by Strongly Unfavorable Public Opinion (Oct. 19, 1999), at http://www.
gallup.com/content/default.asp?ci=3529&pgl (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
17. On Espy's acquittal, see Neil A. Lewis, Espy Is Acquitted on Gifts Received While
in Cabinet, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al. For a scathing assessment of Smaltz's behavior,
see Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's OIC and the ClintonLewinsky Affair, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 639, 672-73 (1999) ("[T]he jury acquitted Espy on all
counts precisely because they saw how fanatically imprudent it was [for Smaltz] to blow up
Espy's small-scale sins into major felonies.").
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Another risk is a good deal larger. Suppose Clinton had been not an
incumbent President but an ex-Governor and possible future Senator
from Arkansas. Suppose further that his likely sentence, were he convicted of fraud in connection with Whitewater and the looting of Madison
Guaranty Savings & Loan, would be very long: say, twenty years in a federal prison. Now suppose the prosecution offered him a guilty plea for
Monica-related perjury and obstruction with very little prison time, perhaps in exchange for helpful testimony against other defendants. Under
those circumstances, a conviction for the "crimes" arising out of the
Lewinsky affair seems quite possible, even likely-and it does not depend
on any jury's willingness to conclude that those crimes merit punishment.
Notice, though, that this risk is not peculiar to pretext cases. On the contrary, it is present whenever (1) multiple criminal offenses can be
charged-which they always can, with or without a "detour" crime-and
(2) the difference between the potential sentence for the potential top
count and the sentence available for lesser charges is substantial-which
it usually is, at least in federal cases. Liberaljoinder rules and harsh sentencing guidelines pose that risk, not prosecutorial pretexts.
The fourth feature of cases like Capone's, Clinton's, and Stewart's
goes not to the crimes but to the targets. Other mobsters sold booze,
killed rivals, and bought local politicians, but no one received the kind of
law enforcement attention that Capone got. Not coincidentally, no other
mobster had Capone's national reputation.1 8 So too with Bill Clinton
and Martha Stewart. Plainly, celebrity prosecution is a different phenomenon than pretextual prosecution. But the two phenomena seem to overlap surprisingly often. Perhaps it is worth considering them in tandem.
This prosecutorial focus on celebrities sounds fishiest of all; it smacks
of the phenomenon Tom Wolfe described in The Bonfire of the Vanities
when he wrote of prosecutors' single-minded pursuit of "The Great

18. At least until Lucky Luciano rose to fame in the mid-1930s-whereupon he was
promptly taken down by Manhattan District Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, who thereby
became America's first celebrity prosecutor. The Luciano case made Dewey, who was then
in his mid-thirties and had held no higher public office, an instant presidential prospect:
In 1939, he led Franklin D. Roosevelt in nationwide polls. See Richard Norton Smith,
Thomas E. Dewey and His Times 189-206, 285-86 (1982).

The Capone pattern has held ever since. Frank Costello won nationwide fame when
he testified before the Kefauver Commission in the spring of 1951. Shortly afterward,
Costello was convicted of tax evasion. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). John
Gotti offers a more contemporary example of the phenomenon. By comparison, Anthony
Accardo-the heir to much of Capone's organization-never spent a night in jail and died
peacefully at age eighty-six in 1992. See Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the
Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer's
Clash with Donaldson over Turf, the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough
Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 Ohio St.J. Crim. L. 443, 450 n.25 (2004). Mobsters do
well to keep their names out of the papers. Those with more of a taste for publicity tend to
pay for their fame.
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White Defendant."19 As Robert Gordon argues, that pursuit seems
squarely at odds with the rule of law; it promotes "arbitrary and ... politically motivated prosecution." 20 Gordon continues:
I expect that most of us would have no objection to a random
audit of civil perjury, something like an IRS random audit of tax
returns, in which the DA's office pulled transcripts to identify
and then investigate plausible perjurers for purposes of general
deterrence. But when the DA singles out a public figure for exemplary punishment for behavior that in most would draw a miobject of the lesson looks like a marnor sanction or a pass, the
21
tyr and the DA a villain.
Monroe Freedman made a similar point thirty-seven years ago, in the
course of challenging grudge-based prosecutions like Attorney General
Robert Kennedy's efforts to "get" union boss Jimmy Hoffa. 2 2 Freedman
began by challenging the argument that,
if the individual is in fact guilty of the crime with which he is
charged, the motive of the prosecutor is immaterial. This contention overlooks the fact that there are few of us who have led
such unblemished lives as to prevent a determined prosecutor
from finding some basis for an indictment or an information.
Thus, to say that the prosecutor's motive is immaterial, is tojustify making virtually every citizen the potential victim of arbitrary
23
discretion.
Freedman went on to assert that prosecutors have an "ethical obligation"
not to abuse their power by bringing "prosecutions that are directed at
24
individuals rather than at crimes."
One obvious response is that all prosecutions are directed at individuals; we do not prosecute criminal conduct in the abstract. The question
cannot be whether to target individuals, but whether a particular criterion is a legitimate ground for targeting. And on that score, celebrity
status resembles "worth a detour": Both are less problematic sorting devices than first appears. Crimes like perjury, obstruction, and tax evasion
must be enforced only occasionally; more systematic enforcement is unaffordable. If what happens in most cases-nothing-is the just result in all
cases, such crimes can never be punished. And if only a few such cases
can be brought, the best way to maximize the deterrent bang for the law
19. Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities 491 (1987). Concern for Great White
Defendants might seem strange in a system whose prison population is as heavily African
American as is ours. But in truth it isn't strange at all: In a world where there aren't many
rich white defendants, nailing one for a high-profile violent crime is likely to be a real
coup.
20. Gordon, supra note 17, at 672.
21. Id. at 672-73.
22. Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting
Attorney, 55 Geo. LJ. 1030 (1967).
23. Id. at 1034-35.
24. Id. at 1035.
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enforcement buck is to bring well-publicized cases.2 5 What better way to
guarantee publicity than to pick defendants whose every move will be covered by every news outlet? When a high public official like Clinton is
involved, this calculus is reinforced by another. Once a president is even
technically guilty of criminal dishonesty and the crime is known (both to
investigators and to the public), law enforcers can send only two signals:
Either truth matters and lies will be punished, or presidents are above the
law. 2 6 The second signal is, at the least, unattractive-the strongest argu27
ment made by those who favored Clinton's impeachment.
A version of that argument applies as well to high corporate officers
and rich celebrities who are sometimes investigated for business crimes.
High-end white-collar defendants like Michael Milken or Martha Stewart
became celebrities in part because they got more than their share of the
benefits of American prosperity. If legal protections for property and
contract rights are of any value at all in a capitalist economy, 28 it seems
fair to conclude that such people have gotten a very good deal from the
legal system. Holding them to a somewhat higher standard of integrity
than less prosperous souls seems a reasonable quid pro quo. As for the
claim that this approach violates the rule of law, many white-collar crimes
(securities violations are an obvious example) are necessarily a kind of
class legislation, since only members of the relevant class engage in the
regulated transactions-the flip side of Anatole France's famous line
25. Cf. Mark E. Matthews, New IRS Publicity Strategy, U.S. Attorneys' Bulletin, July
2001, at 15, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareading_room/usab4904.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that since surveyed taxpayers wanted to
hear about tax evasion prosecutions, IRS must do better job of publicizing enforcement
efforts).
26. As Robert Gordon has argued, Starr could easily have avoided sending this
unpleasant signal without investigating the Lewinsky affair. See Gordon, supra note 17, at
648-50. Starr first learned of Clinton's affair with Lewinsky before Clinton was deposed in
the Paula Jones case. Had Starr quietly passed word to Clinton's lawyers that news of the
relationship was out, and that any perjury in the deposition would be taken seriously by the
independent counsel's office, the story might have played out very differently. Clinton
could have settled the Jones case then, or taken a default judgment and litigated
damages-an especially attractive move for him, as it is not obvious that there were
damages. There would have been no perjury or obstruction of justice to investigate.
27. There were a number of examples of this argument at the Clinton impeachment
hearings; the best (in our view) was the testimony of the holder of the Distinguished
Leadership Chair at the Naval Academy, who testified that, as Commander-in-Chief, the
President must be held to the highest possible standards of integrity in all he does. See
Consequences of Perjury and Related Crimes, supra note 15, at 76-78 (statement of Leon
A. Edney, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)).
28. This was the central insight of the early legal realists: Property and contract rights
are not neutral and natural, and a Hobbesian state of nature would have a very different
distribution of wealth than a modern capitalist legal order. For the classic argument, see
Robert L. Hale, Freedom Through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power 3-12
(1952) (arguing that by assigning and enforcing legal rights of property and contract, the
law does not just protect existing rights but actually contributes to economic inequality).
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about laws that ban sleeping under bridges. 29 Similarly, in the political
world, a host of legal requirements governing things like gratuities and
campaign contributions applies only to those who hold or seek public
office and not to those they represent. Is a ban on highly publicized perjury and obstruction of justice, enforced by prosecuting only public
figures, really so different?
Celebrity mobsters raise fewerjustice concerns. If there is a problem
with the disparity between Capone's fate and the fate of less well-known
criminals, the problem lies in the latter cases, not the former. Besides,
famous criminals make ideal defendants for rarely (but still occasionally)
enforced crimes. One of the best-known men of his time, Al Capone was
famous precisely for his ability to live outside the law's commands. Prosecuting such a man for cheating on his taxes sent several useful messages:
about the importance of paying taxes, about the rule of law, 30 and last but
not least, about the federal government's competence.
The bottom line seems clear enough. As a prosecutorial strategy for
enforcing white-collar crimes like those at issue in the Capone, Clinton,
and Stewart cases, pretextual targeting appears to be both fair and reasonable. Some crimes must be enforced sparingly, yet still enforced. Enforcing such crimes against defendants suspected of other crimes conserves investigative resources and reduces the risk of serious injustice.
And enforcing such crimes against public figures amplifies the law's deterrent signal. At the same time, the worst kinds of pretextual prosecution are self-deterring, since juries and judges alike are free to acquit for
any reason and are reasonably likely to acquit in the most sympathetic
cases.
While there is a basic unfairness in some pretext cases-Clinton is an
example in our view, though Capone and Stewart are not-the unfairness
goes not to pretext but to the content of substantive criminal law. If the
criminal law of dishonesty is too broad, Clintonian transgressions will
31
sometimes lead to undeserved prison terms, with or without pretexts.
The same is true if the rules that govern sentences give prosecutors the
29. "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." Anatole France, The Red Lily 95
(Winifred Stephens trans., 1927) (1894).
30. Notice the irony. Conventional application of rule-of-law arguments would cut
the other way: Capone was held to a different and more exacting standard than most of
the population, and he was punished much more severely than ordinary tax cheats of his
time, or of our time, for that matter. Yet failing to punish Capone, treating him just like
the average tax cheat who gets away with his crime, would have sent the signal that rich
mobsters are above the law. That is a disastrous signal for any legal system to send.
31. The risk is even greater when criminal law is let loose on sexual morality. See,
e.g., Richard Gid Powers, Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI
62-70 (2004) (discussing the prosecution of champion boxer Jack Johnson for violating
the Mann Act). Powers notes that:
Parkin [Johnson's prosecutor] admitted that while Johnson the "individual" may
have been unfairly singled out for prosecution, "it was his misfortune to be the
foremost example of the evil in permitting the intermarriage of whites and blacks
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power to threaten more years in the penitentiary than anyone thinks fair
in order to extort guilty pleas to the sentences they want. The proper way
to deal with those dangers is to limit substantive law, not to regulate prosecutors' motives. If crimes are fairly defined and sentences are fairly calibrated, the motives will take care of themselves.
This is essentially what courts have concluded. There has been scattered litigation in Capone-like cases over the years, with defendants raising various constitutional challenges to their prosecutions. Save for a few
exceptional cases, the challenges have failed. Two obscure state court
decisions capture the lay of the land. People v. Mantel was a prosecution
for criminal violations of New York's building code. 3 2 The defendants
ran a Times Square sex shop. They claimed that prosecutors were targeting sex shops instead of enforcing the building code across the board.
The court treated the claim contemptuously, noting that sex shop propri33
etors were not exactly a "suspect class" for equal protection purposes.
There are a lot of cases like Mantel; claimants lose even when they can
show (as the Mantel defendants could not) membership in some suspect
class. The presumption of proper prosecutorial motive is virtually
34
irrebuttable.
There are very few cases like People v. Kail.35 As part of a police
crackdown on prostitution, officers in Champaign, Illinois were instructed to arrest suspected prostitutes for anything and everything in the
criminal code and local ordinances. Kail was a prostitute in Champaign.
She was arrested for riding a bicycle without a bell, in violation of a local
criminal ordinance. A search incident to arrest turned up some drugs,
for which Kail was later convicted. The Kail court overturned the conviction, on the legally dubious ground that the arrest violated the Equal
37
Protection Clause. 36 A spirited dissent cited and quoted Mantel.
Based on the conventional debate about pretextual prosecutions, the
combination of Mantel and Kail is close to ideal. Mantel establishes that
he has violated the law. Now it is his function to teach others the law must be
respected."
Id. at 69. Johnson's case is a particularly chilling example of the underside of celebrity
prosecution and the high cost of overcriminalization.
32. 388 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1976).
33. See id. at 566-69.
34. The key case is United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), which holds that,
in order to obtain discovery, the complaining defendant must point to similarly situated
persons who could have been prosecuted but were not. How many such persons the
claimant need identify is unclear, but the number is probably substantial. To prevail, the
defendant must also show that the prosecutorial policy was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 463-71. Successful claims are almost impossible to find. For an excellent
analysis of the problem-written nearly a decade before Armstrong, but still on point-see
generally Steven Allen Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1365 (1987).
35. 501 N.E.2d 979 (Ill. 1986).
36. Id. at 980-82.
37. Id. at 982-83 (Green, J., dissenting).
...
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pretextual targeting is fine, constitutionally speaking-unless, as in Kail,
the nominal charge is, well, nominal. Targeting people like Capone is
not a problem, unless the charges are transparently trumped up.
The real problem is that Kail's insight is rarely taken seriously. The
Second Circuit's approach in United States v. McFadden38 is more typical.
McFadden was stopped for riding his bicycle on a sidewalk. He was
searched "incident to arrest" (though it seems implausible that the police
actually planned to arrest him for riding his bike); the search turned up a
gun-which, since McFadden had a prior felony conviction, led to a federal charge under the felon-in-possession statute. The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction. 39 McFadden may apply only to searches; it could be
that a criminal prosecution for the bicycle offense would have led to a
different result. But probably not. The Supreme Court has aggressively
regulated most aspects of criminal procedure; the latest example is the
constitutionalization of procedures used for finding so-called "sentencing
facts."'40 That aggressiveness does not apply, however, to overcriminalization and oversentencing, both of which the Court has been loath to
tackle directly. Serious constitutional limits on substantive criminal law,
apart from the occasional "privacy" decision 41 or crimes with some free
speech angle, 42 do not exist. Nor are there significant limits on legisla43
tures' ability to attach immodest sentences to modest crimes.
With that large qualification, it appears that courts have itjust about
right-if, but only if, the chief problem with pretextual prosecutions is
38. 238 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2001).
39. Id. at 199-204.
40. See Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding it unconstitutional
to remove from the jury any fact-other than fact of prior conviction-that increases
penalty "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum"); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
2531, 2536-37 (2004) (holding that the "statutory maximum" referred to in Apprendi "is
not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after additional facts, but the maximum
he may impose without any additional findings").
41. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a state
law regulating private sexual conduct between members of the same sex, but not members
of the opposite sex); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that abortion is a
fundamental privacy right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)
(invalidating state ban on contraceptives on ground of marital privacy). These cases are
not primarily about the scope of substantive criminal law; rather, their focus is on the
scope of sexual and reproductive freedom. It might have been otherwise: Griswold, which
gave birth to the relevant line of cases, seemed to signal judicial willingness to overturn
statutes that criminalize innocuous or widely tolerated behavior. For a brief exploration of
that road not taken, see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale LJ. 1, 68-69 (1997).
42. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (conviction for flag
desecration held unconstitutional).
43. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (affirming life sentence under
recidivist statute for theft of three golf clubs); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96
(1991) (affirming life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine). For an excellent
discussion that contrasts these cases with the more stringent proportionality-style limits on
punitive damages, see generally Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due Process
Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 880 (2004).
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the risk of convictions on trumped-up charges. But there are other, more
serious problems. The public had a strong interest in knowing whether
Bill Clinton was guilty of any more-than-technical crimes in connection
with the Whitewater Development Corporation and Madison Guaranty
Savings & Loan. The Lewinsky investigation left that issue murky. 44 Did
Starr's office go for the blue dress because Clinton was guilty of serious
but hard-to-prove fraud, or only because a sex scandal was a ticket to
headlines and talk shows? This leads to another important public interest: Voters needed to know whether Starr and his staff were doing their
jobs well-which depended mostly on what they did or didn't find out
about Whitewater, not about Monica. Wholly apart from the harm it did
to our politics, the Lewinsky investigation left unresolved the central
question that needed resolving in the public's mind-Clinton's guilt or
innocence of Whitewater-related charges-and made it harder to evaluate the independent counsel's investigation of that central question.
Muddied signals are not always a problem in pretext cases: Sometimes, voters and legislative oversight committees have good alternative
sources of information about the relevant crimes and the relevant
criminals. After all, everyone knew what Capone was up to. Where that is
so, prosecutors can maximize some mix of the odds of conviction and the
extent of punishment and ignore the nature of the crime charged. But
where substitute signals are absent, pretextual targeting may prove quite
costly. Notice too that individual prosecutors do not internalize the relevant costs: The line prosecutor gets much of the benefit of a conviction;
if the conviction is for the wrong crime, the costs of that mistake will be
borne over time by the prosecutor's office, by other law enforcement
agencies, and by the voters. This creates a serious problem of political
economy. The system as a whole functions best when prosecutors charge
for the crime that motivated the investigation, but individual prosecutors
may prefer pretextual charges.
Again, the political economy problem does not exist everywhere.
For example, it is (or was-such cases are mostly a thing of the past) not
such a large problem when the defendant is a leading figure in a Mafia
family. Perhaps that is why the Capone strategy arose in cases like
Capone's. As John Ashcroft explained, in the course ofjustifying the use
of similar tactics against suspected terrorists:
Attorney General [Robert] Kennedy made no apologies for
using all of the available resources in the law to disrupt and dismantle organized crime networks. Very often, prosecutors were
aggressive, using obscure statutes to arrest and detain suspected
mobsters. One racketeer and his father were indicted for lying
44. Starr's successor ultimately issued a report finding the available evidence
"insufficient to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that either President or Mrs.
Clinton knowingly participated in any criminal conduct.., or knew of such conduct." See
Robert W. Ray, Independent Counsel, I Final Report of the Independent Counsel In re:
Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association 155 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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on a federal home loan application. A former gunman for the
Capone mob was brought to court on a violation of the Migratory Bird Act. Agents found 563 game birds in his freezer-a
mere 539 birds over the limit.
Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for "spitting on the sidewalk" if it would help in
the battle against organized crime. It has been and will be the
policy of this Department of Justice to use the same
aggressive
45
arrest and detention tactics in the war on terror.
The analogy is not apt. Even during the Mob's heyday, the press and
public could obtain good information on the makeup and conduct of the
leading families, without regard to any criminal litigation. And there
were independent measures of the most serious crimes those families
committed-including homicide. 46 Criminal prosecution and conviction
were not necessary to tell the public that Capone's organization existed,
who belonged to it, or how much of a threat it was. In that setting, prosecutions for bagging too many migratory birds may have been socially
costless. Not so with respect to terrorism, where accurate information is
very hard to come by and independent measures may not exist. In this
context, prosecutions for spitting on sidewalks may prove very costly
indeed.
II. PRETEXT AND FEDERALISM

Historically, pretextual prosecutions of Mafia dons were almost always federal prosecutions. The same is true today of prosecutions of
would-be terrorists. The pretext problem seems closely tied in some manner to federalism.
This fact should seem puzzling. State and federal codes alike contain long lists of crimes like tax evasion, perjury, obstruction of justice,
and the excessive hunting of migratory birds. 4 7 Local district attorneys
45. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the U.S. Mayors
Conference (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2OO1/agcrisis
remarks10_25.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
46. See Fed. Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR): Crime in the United States, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). For excellent discussions of the UCR's history and
significance, see generally Lawrence Rosen, The Creation of the Uniform Crime Report:
The Role of Social Science, 19 Soc. Sci. Hist. 215 (1995); Michael D. Maltz, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bridging Gaps in Police Crime Data (Sept. 1999),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/bgpcd.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). With respect to homicide data in particular, it is worth noting that the two
leading histories of crime in America both treat the UCR's homicide statistics as reliable.
See Roger Lane, Murder in America: A History 242 (1997); Eric H. Monkkonen, Murder
in New York City 10-11, 185 (2001).
47. On the federal code, see, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Report on the Federalization of
Criminal Law 91 appx. C (1998). On state codes, see, for example, Stuntz, Pathological
Politics, supra note 7, at 512-18.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:583

(who enforce state criminal codes) frequently go after defendants for serious crimes for which those defendants cannot easily be convictedwhich sounds like prosecuting Capone for bootlegging-and losing.
Broad criminal codes and hard-to-convict criminal defendants should, in
theory, generate lots of Capone-like prosecutions for more easily proved
offenses. That plainly happens in federal court. But Capone-type cases
are rare in state courts. If we are to solve the pretext problem, we must
first understand why that is so.
A. Local Prosecutions
Most regulatory systems are enforced by a mixture of government
sanctions and private litigation. Securities law, environmental law, and
employment discrimination law all have this character, and there are
many more examples. Criminal law enforcement does not work this way:
The government has a monopoly on it. State legislatures write theirstates' criminal codes. Local district attorneys, elected by their home
counties, enforce those criminal codes. Their case selection decisions are
48
unreviewable.
Four key features of this system push against Capone-style pretextual
prosecutions. First, a small but important part of state criminal codes are
politically mandatory. 49 Local prosecutors do not have the option of ignoring violent felonies and major thefts. The same is true, at least in
some measure, of distribution of hard drugs. No district attorney can
ignore these crimes in order to go after particular targets or pursue some
personal agenda-at least not if she wants to keep herjob. It is important
to understand why that is so: These crimes are politically mandatory both
because they are important to voters and because local prosecutors are
politically accountable for dealing with them. Other provisions of state
criminal codes give prosecutors options; these provisions create
obligations.
Second, there are enough of these politically mandatory crimes to
occupy all or nearly all of local prosecutors' time and manpower. This
has not always been true; there have been periods in American history
when district attorneys' offices had a good deal of slack. But any slack has
long since disappeared, as the following data suggest. In 1974, there were
17,000 local prosecutors in the United States. By 1990, that number had
grown to 20,000.50 During those same years, the number of felony prose48. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 382 (2d Cir.
1973).
49. On the significance of this point for plea bargaining, see William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2563-64,
2567-68 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Criminal Law's Shadow].
50. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prosecutors in State Courts1990, at 2 (1992).
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cutions more than doubled.5 1 Crime has fallen since the early 1990s, but
dockets (and hence prison populations) have continued to grow, and
prosecutors' offices have not caught up with the earlier increase. 52 Extreme docket pressure characterizes DAs' offices, particularly in the large
cities where crime rates tend to be highest. It follows that criminal litigation must be rationed not only based on political necessity but also based
on cost. "Detours" themselves may be cheap, but the investigations that
give rise to them are expensive, and district attorneys cannot afford expensive investigations. That is why high-end white-collar crime is (with a
few rare exceptions) 5 3 a federal preserve; only the feds have the man51. State court felony filings rose 36% from 1978 to 1984. Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts,
State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1984, at 189-90 tbl.35 (1986). They rose
an additional 51% from 1985 to 1991. Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, State Court Caseload
Statistics: Annual Report 1991, at 37 tbl.1.25 (1993). It seems safe to assume that filings
rose between 1984 and 1985 as well, but even if they held constant, the number of felony
cases more than doubled between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.
This massive increase in local criminal dockets was a response to the massive increase
in crime rates that America suffered between about 1960 and 1975: more than 200%,
according to the FBI's numbers. See The Disaster Ctr., United States Crime Rates
1960-2000, available at http://www.disastercenter.com/cime/uscrime.htm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). That massive crime wave coincided
with (and perhaps was partly caused by) a decline in the prison population; the number of
inmates in America's prisons fell 13% between 1960 and 1970, Margaret Werner Cahalan,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Historical Corrections Statistics in the
United States, 1850-1984, at 29 tbl.3-2 (1986), while the crime rate more than doubled.
The number of prisoners rose in the 1970s, but not enough to compensate for the increase
in crime. See id. (showing 34% rise in inmate population between 1960 and 1980). By the
1980s, there was enormous political pressure on local district attorneys to close the gap.
52. The number of state court felony convictions is a good proxy for the size of local
criminal dockets. The year 1990 saw 829,344 felony convictions in state courts. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1992, at
527 tbl.5.49 (1993). By 2000, that number had grown to 924,700. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-2002, at 447
tbl.5.44 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 Sourcebook]. Crime started to fall in 1991; that year,
America's inmate population (those either in jail or prison) stood at 1,216,664. Id. at 478
tbl.6.1. By 2002, it had grown to 2,033,331-an increase of more than two-thirds. Id. The
mushrooming of the prison and jail populations was partly due to inmates serving longer
sentences, but only partly: Average sentence length in state criminal cases (federal
prisoners are a small fraction of the total; their average sentence length is thus a small
factor in these trends) rose a mere 16% between 1993 and 1999. Id. at 505 tbl.6.37.
Plainly, the number of defendants prosecuted for serious crimes has continued to grow
even as crime has fallen.
The number of prosecutors has increased substantially during this time-but not
substantially enough to catch up with the huge docket increases of the 1980s. See CarolJ.
DeFrances, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prosecutors in State Courts,
2001, at 2 (2002) [hereinafter DeFrances, Prosecutors 2001] (putting number of
prosecutors at 27,000, up from 20,000 in 1990).
53. The exceptions are not so rare in New York; the Manhattan District Attorney's
office has both a history of pursuing white-collar crime and some expertise at that
enterprise. Even in that office, however, the pressure to bring winning cases (especially
when the cases occupy so much time and energy) limits the white-collar docket
significantly. And the commitment of incumbent DA Robert Morgenthau to white-collar
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power to deal with the long, intricate paper trails, and only the feds can
afford to initiate and pursue major investigations without being certain
54
that those investigations will turn up evidence of serious crimes.
Local police, on whom district attorneys must depend, 55 also labor
under severe resource constraints. That reinforces district attorneys' tendency to avoid detours. "Detour" crimes tend to arise in long, complex
investigations, where police and prosecutors are working together to go
after a particular set of targets: Think Al Capone, Bill Clinton, or Martha
Stewart. Local police cannot afford long, complex investigations. For
much the same reason, local cops and local prosecutors rarely work together on an investigation; the norm is for police to hand a case off to
56
prosecutors-more a relay race than a team sport.
Third, district attorneys are subject to performance measures that
reinforce their tendency to concentrate on a small list of politically important crimes. The FBI's crime index measures the incidence of nine
offenses: murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, kidnapping, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, and auto theft. The FBI publishes reports about
the number of index crimes nationwide; 57 there is a good deal of publicity attached to these numbers in local jurisdictions. 58 Responsibility for
prosecutions has been squarely criticized by those seeking to unseat him in 2005. See
Robert Kolker, Happy 85th Birthday, Bob Morgenthau, N.Y. Magazine,July 26, 2004, at 44,
47 (noting criticism of Morgenthau's "special interest in Wall Street" by his leading
challenger, Leslie Crocker Snyder); Greg Sargent, Young Scions Gun for an Old
Prosecutor, N.Y. Magazine, Nov. 22, 2004, at 14, 14 (quoting Donald Trump Jr., a Snyder
supporter, as noting: "While white-collar crime is important, we need someone who will
really prosecute criminals-rapists and killers.").
54. The best discussion of white-collar crime investigations deals solely with federal
investigations-a sign of how the federal government has dominated the field. See
generally Kenneth Mann, Defending White Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at Work
(1985).
55. While an increasing number of district attorneys' offices have developed their own
investigative units, see CarolJ. DeFrances, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, U.S. Dep't ofJustice,
State Court Prosecutors in Large Districts, 2001, at 2 tbl.1 (2001) (reporting that staff
investigators comprise 9.9% of total personnel in prosecutors' offices in large districts
(defined as those serving populations of 500,000 or more)), the independent investigative
capabilities of even those offices remain comparatively small because of trial preparation
responsibilities.
56. See Elizabeth Glazer, Thinking Strategically: How Federal Prosecutors Can
Reduce Violent Crime, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 573, 574 (1999); see also Daniel C. Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 793
(2003) [hereinafter Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents] (noting varieties of policeprosecutor interaction).
57. See sources cited supra note 46.
58. The St. Petersburg, Florida, Chief of Police recently noted:
The UCR data represents the official level of crime in the community. These
reports and the news media stories about them can have a significant impact on
the community. They often serve as grist for the political mill-local elections
have been greatly influenced by crime reports. In some cases, the careers of
police chiefs and sheriffs have been affected in either positive or negative ways by
these statistics.
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these numbers falls heaviest on police forces, who report not to district
attorneys but to mayors and city councils. But as the primary and often
the only source of the local district attorney's cases, the local police are
also a potentially loud source of information about a given DA's performance, and they ensure that any district attorney not already fixated on
these reports will soon become so. 5 9 These DAs do not control the relevant yardstick, and they must defend their performance before the voters
every few years. 60 The upshot is that both police departments and DAs'
offices are held responsible for increases in serious crime. 6 1
That combination of political accountability and an independent
performance measure matters in several different ways. Local prosecutors would go after violent crimes and major thefts even without the
crime index. Pressure by victims and the sheer obviousness of a body
lying in the street, a destroyed building, or a hospitalized citizen would
see to that. But the index-specifically, the publicity that it brings to
crime statistics-focuses even more attention on those offenses, since local voters will hear about whether their number is rising or falling, and by
how much. Another effect matters more. The fact that crime statistics
are out there and will be reported gives local prosecutors a strong incentive to prosecute the relevant crimes "straight up" rather than pretextually. If the number of murders in a given jurisdiction is two or three
times the number of murder prosecutions, the DA's opponent in her
next election has an incentive to publicize that fact. 62 Voters will know it;
Darrel W. Stephens, Measuring What Matters, in Nat'l Inst. of Justice, NCJ No. 170610,
Measuring What Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings 55,
56 (Robert H. Langworthy, ed., 1999), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/170610-2.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Measuring What Matters]. This is not
to say that UCR data offers a satisfactory method of judging police performance or even of
measuing a community's perception of crime. See George Kelling, Measuring What
Matters: A New Way of Thinking About Crime and Public Order, in Measuring What
Matters, supra, at 27, 27; John J. Dilulio, Jr., Rethinking the Criminal Justice System:
Toward a New Paradigm, in Performance Measures for the Criminal Justice System,
Princeton University Study Group I (Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1993).
59. For an example of district attorneys' strong interest in the public's perception, see
William Glaberson, Caught Between the Law and the Written Word, N.Y. Times, July 9,
2004, at B4 (discussing 2004 civil suit by ADA demoted and later fired for calling Brooklyn
"the best place to be a homicide prosecutor" because it had "more dead bodies per square
inch than anyplace else").
60. In 2001, chief prosecutors were elected in all jurisdictions except Alaska,
Connecticut, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia. DeFrances, Prosecutors 2001,
supra note 52, at 2.
61. The movement for community prosecution has only heightened this trend. See
Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public Accountability:
The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 28-29 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't,
Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 00-02-04, 2000), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.
edu/criminaljustice/publications/community-prosecution.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Coles, Community Prosecution].
62. We are quite aware that the results of a single high-profile case can loom larger in
the minds of the electorate in a district attorney race than an office's overall performance.
See Alan Abrahamson, Garcetti Is Named Winner over Lynch, L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1996,
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they will get the impression that the DA and the local police are not paying enough attention to murders-even if many of those murderers were
prosecuted and convicted for something else (and punished severely),
just as Capone was charged, convicted, and punished for cheating on his
taxes. The DA could try, of course, to shift blame somewhere else, but
that strategy would not work very well since voters understand that she,
and she alone, controls criminal prosecutions in her county. The politically smart move is to maximize not convictions of murderers, but convic6
tions for murder. 3
The crime index may matter in one more way. The availability of
good crime data makes local prosecutors' offices responsible, at least in
part, for the ups and downs of the rates of crimes that comprise the index. Sure, other factors like the economy or local demography probably
affect the crime rate more than prosecutorial strategies do. 64 But prosecutors and police-so quick to take credit for crime drops-have to act
like they are addressing the reported statistics. Prosecutors thus have an
incentive to engage in the charging practices that most efficiently deter
index crimes: violent felonies and major thefts. The most efficient deterrent signal is the simplest one-punishing killers for killing, thieves for
stealing, kidnappers for kidnapping, and so forth. Criminals, or at least
some of them, may pay attention to the price of crime, but few study it
with great care. If criminals are punished for different crimes than the
ones that caused prosecutors to go after them, the punishment sends
would-be criminals a confused signal; any deterrent effect on the underlying crime is diluted. It seems likely that elected district attorneys prefer
to maximize the deterrent effect on the crimes that are best measured; it
at B1 (noting role of OJ. Simpson case in close Los Angeles district attorney election);
Steve Lipsher, Bryant Prosecutor Relieved After Close Call: Eagle County's Mark Hurlbert
Retains His Seat After Trailing Newcomer Bruce Brown at One Point. He Vows to Make
Changes, Denver Post, Nov. 4, 2004, at B4 (noting role that dismissed case against Kobe
Bryant played in close election that ultimately returned DA to office). But the absence of
overall performance issues actually supports our point. Indeed, the high political stakes of
these prosecutions makes it even more interesting that pretextual charges are not brought
in these situations.
63. See Coles, Community Prosecution, supra note 61, at 10 (noting that under the
"felony case processor strategy" that has dominated large offices, prosecutors focus on core
violent crimes and major thefts, and their "operational goal becomes maximizing the
felony conviction rate"). Note: the felony conviction rate, not the conviction rate.
Along similar lines, James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob long ago noted the following
working rule in local prosecutors' offices: "The charges on which [defendants] are
convicted must be about as near to the original charges as is customary." James Eisenstein
& Herbert Jacob, Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis for Criminal Courts 47
(1977). The baseline assumption is conformity with the original charge; deviation from
that baseline requires some justification. The usual original charge is the offense of arrest,
which is ordinarily fixed by the police, not by the prosecutor's office.
64. See generally Symposium, Why Is Crime Decreasing?, 88 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1173 (1998) ("Taken together, [the symposium] articles make clear that
there is no single cause or explanation for the recent decline in crime . . ").
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also seems likely that pretextual charging is a poor means of achieving
that goal.
The fourth factor may be the most important. For the state law
crimes that are punished most consistently-basically, FBI index crimes
65
plus distribution of serious drugs-state criminal law functions as law.
As we have already noted, prosecutors prosecute these crimes systematically and aggrfssively, meaning that, at least roughly, the crimes are enforced as written. Legal definitions are not a cover for strategic charging
patterns. Murder, manslaughter, robbery, and aggravated assault-all
these crimes have conduct and intent terms that roughly correspond to
the behavior prosecutors seek to punish. Those legal definitions are reasonably consistent, across both time and place-one reason why these
crimes are good vehicles for comparing crime rates. Consistent, nonstrategic crime definition may flow from another characteristic index
crimes share: They also have public definitions. Burglary, kidnapping,
and rape are not just technical legal terms; ordinary citizens know what
those terms mean. 6 6 That fact constrains state legislators. Members of
Congress can redefine mail and wire fraud to mean, roughly, undisclosed
breach of fiduciary duty (as they have), but no state legislature could
redefine murder to include nonnegligent homicide. Voters would think
such an enterprise silly, or worse. Jurors might refuse to apply the strategic definitions.
In sum, politically accountable local district attorneys must spend the
bulk of their time enforcing a small number of serious crimes. Those
crimes are defined nonstrategically. They must be enforced, roughly, as
written. That is not a recipe for pretextual prosecution.
At first blush, the rise of "community policing"-and the associated
(though less commented on) rise of "community prosecution"-might
seem to change that state of affairs. The 1980s and 1990s saw many police departments, particularly in urban areas, move toward new problemoriented policing techniques and away from simple call-and-response
case processing. 67 That meant more police involvement in patrolled areas, and broader and deeper relationships with local residents and businesses. It also meant more enforcement of what were previously thought
to be minor crimes-vandalism, vice, various sorts of loitering-both in
order to make troubled neighborhoods more livable for their residents
and as a means of reducing major crimes. 68 Beginning in the 1990s, many
65. See Stuntz, Criminal Law's Shadow, supra note 49, at 2563-64.
66. See Stephens, supra note 58, at 57 ("One useful aspect [of the UCR] is that it
provides a relatively simple method of classifying criminal incidents that are brought to the
attention of the police by the public. Even with the limitations, it provides a common
language that most people, police officers and citizens alike, can understand.").
67. For the classic treatment, see generally Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented
Policing (1990).
68. For two contrasting views of this style of police work, compare George L. Kelling &
Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in
Our Communities (1996), with Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise
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prosecutors' offices followed this same pattern of greater involvement
with local communities, more "say" in charging practices by crime victims,
greater attention to "quality of life" offenses-all characteristic of the
69
same problem-solving approaches police departments had adopted.
Notice that one common feature of some kinds of community policing and prosecution is the enforcement of low-level crimes as a means of
catching and punishing criminals guilty of much worse offenses. The
classic example comes from the New York subway system: Stepped-up enforcement of minor crimes like turnstile jumping led police to offenders
with outstanding warrants on major crimes, and serious subway crime fell
sharply. 70 That approach-going after "broken windows" offenses in order to get at other, worse crimes-sounds like the Capone strategy. But it
is actually Capone in reverse: Turnstile jumping wasn't a convenient substitute charge to take the place of major felonies. Rather, it allowed police to catch people who could then be convicted of those major felonies. 71 It is as if the tax investigation had led to homicide, conspiracy,
and bootlegging charges against Capone, instead of the other way
around. In such cases, the prosecuted offense is the "real" one, not a
pretext.
Aside from these reverse-pretext cases, the biggest effect of community policing and prosecution is to encourage prosecutors to enforce allegedly "minor" crimes non-pretextually, not as stand-ins for something
else. 7 2 When Police Chief William Bratton wrote about going after turnstile jumpers, he made it clear that the chief goal of the enterprise was to

of Broken Windows Policing (2001). For the best analysis of the legal implications of these
police tactics, see generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1997).
69. For a good account of the rise of community prosecution and its relationship to
community policing, see Coles, Community Prosecution, supra note 61, at 17-22, 32-35;
see also Am. Prosecutors Research Inst., The Changing Nature of Prosecution:
Community Prosecution vs. Traditional Prosecution Approaches (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/changing-nature-oLprosecution.pdf
(on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (surveying extent to which community prosecution methods have
been adopted).
70. See William J. Bratton, Great Expectations: How Higher Expectations for Police
Departments Can Lead to a Decrease in Crime, in Measuring What Matters, supra note 58,
at 11, 13.
71. "[Albout one in seven of people arrested for fare evasion was wanted on a
warrant" for another offense. Id. at 13.
72. As Catherine Coles put it:
But where police have moved into community policing, and where prosecutors
have direct contacts with citizens, this demand [for community prosecution]
increasingly takes the form of requests for prosecutors to handle notjust felonies,
but also offenses such as prostitution, low-level drug dealing, aggressive
panhandling, intimidation of elderly residents by juveniles, and other quality-oflife crimes that affect local neighborhoods.
Coles, Community Prosecution, supra note 61, at 22.
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stop people from jumping the turnstiles.7 3 That means more docket
pressure-recall the data that show caseloads rising while crime was falling through the 1990s 74-leaving prosecutors less time for "detour" prosecutions. Greater community involvement in prosecution also generally
75
means that local prosecutors must pay more attention to crime victims.

That too tends to work against pretexts: Victims are likely to care about
punishing the crimes that victimize them, not other, unrelated offenses.
State codes remain full of "crimes" that invite strategic prosecution.
Overcriminalization is a problem at the state and federal levels alike. But
it matters much less at the state level, because the prosecutors who enforce those overbroad state codes have little time or incentive to exploit
the opportunities those codes give them. 76 The data generally support
that proposition. 77 Consider guilty plea rates. Given their severe budget
constraints and the charging opportunities that broad state criminal
codes leave to them, local prosecutors should achieve plea rates approaching one hundred percent. If a murder case looks like a possible
acquittal, the prosecutor should find another charge that carries a prison
term that can be pinned on the defendant; if enough charges are stacked
together, inducing a plea should be easy even if the odds of conviction
are low. Federal prosecutors do not have to prosecute (and convict) particular defendants, at least not many of them; their relative unaccountability leaves them free to pursue their own agendas, such as obtaining trial experience. 78 Nor do they labor under the severe budget
constraints that local prosecutors face. All of which should lead to lower
guilty plea rates in federal court. Yet federal prosecutors actually have
73. See Bratton, supra note 70, at 12 (calling farebeating "a petty crime that can
collectively amount to a colossal theft").
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
75. See Coles, Community Prosecution, supra note 61, at 16-17.
76. See Stuntz, Criminal Law's Shadow, supra note 49, at 2565-68 (contrasting federal
and state crimes and prosecutions). One of us has argued in earlier work that state and
federal legislators alike have incentives to define crimes strategically, and that local and
federal prosecutors alike have incentives to exploit those strategically defined crimes. See
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, passim. That argument is only partly correct: It
ignores the factors discussed in this Essay, which push toward much more accountability
for local prosecutors than for their federal counterparts.
77. To the extent that local prosecutors truly embrace the community prosecution
model, the issue of pretextual prosecutions and the accountability problems raised by
them become more salient. See Coles, Community Prosecution, supra note 61, at 18, 20.
78. There is some evidence that federal prosecutors do pursue such career goals in
their case selection decisions. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors
Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 259
(2000) (arguing that federal prosecutors seek certain cases to develop their legal skills and
connections); Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Size, Monitoring, and Plea Rate: An
Examination of United States Attorneys 15-16 (July 10, 2000), available at http://fmwww.
bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/OO89.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting that
young prosecutors are prone to take cases to trial to acquire human capital unless they are
clQsely monitored).
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higher guilty plea rates than their local counterparts. 79 Both trial and
acquittal rates for murder cases brought by local district attorneys' offices
are high, a good deal more so than for felonies as a whole.8 0 These data
suggest that, at least in high-crime cities and counties, "truth in charging"
is a fairly strong norm and that district attorneys in those high-crime jurisdictions prefer to charge serious crimes and lose than to charge unrelated lesser crimes and win.
There may be a partial exception in drug cases, which is why the
guilty plea rate in drug cases is higher than the rate for violent crimes and
major thefts. 81 No good external measures of drug crime exist; there is
no way to know how many sales of cocaine or heroin occurred in a given
jurisdiction over a given period of time. That may explain why pretextual
prosecutions-say, charging someone believed to be a dealer with possession of amounts that, in someone else's hands, might be shrugged off as
user quantity-are more common than in street-crime cases.
As the drug example suggests, this system is far from perfect. But at
least for core crimes, meaning violent felonies and major thefts, the legal
and political systems seem to reinforce one another. The law functions as
law: These core crimes seem to be defined nonstrategically and in rough
accord with public definitions. Prosecutors generally charge the crimes
they believe defendants have committed, even when that practice poses a
significant risk of acquittal. And voters know how large or small the gap
is between the crimes their jurisdictions suffer and the criminal charges
their prosecutors file.
B. FederalProsecutions
These patterns are pretty much absent from the federal system. Federal prosecutors do not have primary responsibility for crime control in
theirjurisdictions. Consequently, their dockets include only a small number of politically mandatory crimes-the equivalent of FBI index crimes
in a local DA's office. Federal criminal law gives U.S. Attorneys and their
79. In fiscal year 2000, 96% of federal felony convictions were by guilty plea. 2002
Sourcebook, supra note 52, at 416 tbl.5.17. The comparable figure in state cases was 95%.
Id. at 448 tbl.5.46.
80. The plea rate for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter was only 58%. Id. at
448 tbl.5.46. Though the 2002 Sourcebook figures (based on a study of seventy-five counties)
show a very low acquittal rate in murder cases, id. at 455 tbl.5.57, the rate historically has
been relatively high. The 2000 Sourcebook found that 5% of murder defendants were tried
and acquitted, compared to 1% of felony defendants overall. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-2000, at 463 tbl.5.53
(2001). The 1990 Sourcebook found that nearly one-third of murder cases that went to trial
ended in an acquittal-roughly double the acquittal rate for felony trials in general. See
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1990, at 526 tbl.5.51 (1991).
81. A study of seventy-five counties showed 97% of felony drug convictions were by
guilty plea. 2002 Sourcebook, supra note 52, at 455 tbl.5.57. The plea rate for property
offenses was 96%. Id. Only 90% of convictions for violent crimes were by guilty plea. Id.
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assistants an enormous range of charging options: The scope of responsibility may be small, but jurisdiction is quite large. The combination
means that federal prosecutors have both the time and the authority to
do what they want, including pursuing investigative detours. It also
means they tend to think about criminal prohibitions as tools for nailing
the targets of federal investigations, not as rules they must enforce systematically. Again, that tendency encourages detour prosecutions. Performance measures like the FBI's crime index do not exist for federal crimes;
the absence of such measures reinforces the importance of prosecutors'
preferences in charging practices. Last but not least, federal criminal law
is not at all like the state laws that define violent crimes and major theft
offenses. Murder and robbery statutes cover murders and robberies, as
those terms are generally understood. Federal fraud offenses, by contrast, cover a great deal more than core fraud. This distinction is not
merely technical. All American codes are filled with strategically defined
crimes. In the states, those crimes are mostly ignored. In the federal
system, they are the staples of criminal litigation. These strategically defined crimes give prosecutors, who are already inclined toward pretextual
charging strategies, a great many opportunities to engage in those
strategies.
Begin with the two central truths of federal criminal law enforcement: a very small sphere of responsibility coupled with a very large
sphere of jurisdiction. Minimal responsibility is a consequence of local
law enforcement agencies, to whom voters assign the job of crime control. Maximal jurisdiction is due to the interplay of Congress and federal
law enforcers.
Responsibility first. Local police forces and prosecutors' offices have
been in charge of crime control since those agencies first came on the
scene during the first half of the nineteenth century. 82 Even where they
had the constitutional power to do so, federal and state governments had
little interest in taking over that job.8 3 Over time, local control has become the dominant characteristic of American criminal justice.
Federal prosecutors have had their own sphere of exclusive responsibility, but historically that sphere was politically modest apart from na82. The rise of these local agencies, especially district attorneys' offices, has been a
surprisingly neglected topic. For the best treatment to date, see generally George Fisher,

Plea Bargaining's Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in America (2003).
83. See generally Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the

Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 Emory L.J. 1 (1996) (discussing history of
federal criminal law and federal criminal jurisdiction). For a striking early example of
federal reluctance, see United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818). The
defendant, William Bevans, was a Marine "acting as sentry" on board the U.SS.
Independence, which was then anchored in Boston Harbor. Bevans murdered a cook's
mate on board the ship. In an opinion by ChiefJustice John Marshall, the Supreme Court
overturned his federal conviction, explaining that while Congress could have passed a
murder statute specifically covering federal warships, it had not yet done so. Consequently,
the matter was left to Massachusetts's exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 391.
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tional security cases: counterfeiting and immigration crimes instead of
murders and rapes. That sphere of exclusive federal responsibility was
numerically as well as politically small. Prohibition left in its wake a sizeable federal enforcement bureaucracy 4-not nearly large enough to take
over primary responsibility for ordinary law enforcement, but too large to
confine itself to areas where federal criminal law occupied the field. Ever
since the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, that federal bureaucracy-the
various investigative and prosecutorial agencies that make up the Justice
Department (with some important components from other Cabinet agencies, notably Treasury, thrown in for good measure) 8 5-has sought out
other uses for its time and talents, creating a kind of bureaucratic demand for broad federal criminal jurisdiction to give FBI agents and Assis86
tant United States Attorneys interesting things to do with their time.
Congress has been all too happy to meet that demand, especially in
the past generation. Partly, that is because doing so has been cheap.
When the Justice Department asks for some new criminal prohibition,
there is rarely much interest-group opposition, so the inertia threshold
that limits other kinds of legislation tends to be low.8 7 And the benefits
of criminal legislation can be substantial: Congress can take a symbolic
stand against some new crime fad without worrying much about consequences, since local police and prosecutors retain real responsibility.
That is how we've ended up with federal laws against carjacking, domestic
violence, and a lot else. 88 Federal courts periodically try to rein in this
84. However, the bureaucracy was mostly devoted to the enforcement of the Volstead
Act, not other federal crimes. Thus, the FBI had only about 400 agents in 1930; they were
responsible for "secur[ing]" convictions in slightly more than 4,300 prosecutions that year,
most of them for violations of the ban on interstate transportation of stolen automobiles.
See J. Edgar Hoover, Report of the Director of the Bureau of Investigation, in Annual
Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1930, at 79, 80-81
(1930). Those 4,300 cases were a small fraction of the federal criminal docket's 87,300
cases, roughly 65% of which were for Prohibition violations. Edward Rubin, A Statistical
Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, I Law & Contemp. Probs. 494, 497 tbl.1 (1934).
85. For a (pre-Homeland Security) discussion of the various federal police agencies
and their interactions with local police agencies, see Daniel C. Richman, The Changing
Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement, in 2 Criminal Justice 2000:
Boundary Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations 81, 93-99 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, ed.,
2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/criminal-justice2000/vol_2/02d2.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
86. Cf. Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the
Federalization Debate, 46 Hastings LJ. 967, 973 (1995) (arguing that Congress should
criminalize conduct "even though it intends the jurisdiction it authorizes to be exercised in
a small percentage of cases," and let "prosecutorial discretion" act as "the most important
and effective brake on the federalization of crime"). Gorelick and Litman held topJustice
Department positions at the time their article was published.
87. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757, 771-72 (1999) [hereinafter Richman,
Federal Criminal Law].
88. See id. at 772 ("There are perceived political rewards for supporting all criminal
legislation, particularly if aimed in the direction of some recent outrage, and political
penalties for opposing or seeking to narrow all such laws.").
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expansion. We are in the midst of one such reining-in process now, leading to more rigorous application ofjurisdictional elements; 8 9 a decade or
two ago, the focus was on ratcheting up intent standards for federal criminal statutes. 90 The end result of these judicial ventures is always modest.
They leave federal criminal law more complex, but not narrower.
Little responsibility and vast jurisdiction mean that federal law enforcers must exercise an extraordinary degree of investigative and
prosecutorial discretion in deciding when, and against whom, to invoke
that jurisdiction. Congress has seen to that by coupling promiscuous
criminalization with a fairly small enforcement bureaucracy. As of June
2002, there were only about 93,000 federal law enforcement officers
(compared to more than 700,000 state and local officers), 9 1 and only
40% of them conducted criminal investigations.9 2 The FBI-the sole
agency whose task is general criminal law enforcement-had only 11,248
agents.9 3 The extent to which agents from the various federal agencies
collaborate with federal prosecutors will vary, but federal prosecutions
can be brought only by the five thousand-plus prosecutors in United
89. The case that spawned this trend is, of course, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995). Lopez was a constitutional decision, but its biggest impact has been in cases
involving the interpretation of statutory jurisdictional elements. SeeJones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848, 850-51 (2000) (holding arson of owner-occupied dwellings not within the
scope of the federal arson statute because such dwellings are not "used in" interstate
'commerce"). Since Jones, lower federal court decisions restricting interstate commerce
elements of various federal crimes have become a good deal more common. But perhaps
not as common as the Supreme Court would have it: Brannon Denning and Glenn
Reynolds studied lower court applications of Lopez and its progeny, and found evidence of
"willful judicial foot-dragging." Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and
Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55
Ark. L. Rev. 1253, 1256 (2003); see also Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal
Criminal Law, 55 Hastings L.J. 573, 574-75 (2004) (noting general refusal of federal courts
to extend Lopez and progeny to other cases).
90. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619-20 (1994) (finding that
federal weapons statute requires that a defendant must have been aware of nature of
weapon he possessed); Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136-37 (1994) (holding that
currency "anti-structuring" statute requires proof that defendant must have known he was
illegally evading currency reporting requirement); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
433-34 (1985) (holding that food stamp fraud statute requires proof that defendant knew
his conduct violated governing federal regulations). Within a few months of the Court's
decision, Ratzlafwas overruled by Congress. That seems to have prompted a change in the
Court's posture; the Justices have been much less willing to expand on federal mens rea
requirements since 1994 than previously-and much less willing to limit federal criminal
liability rules that go to conduct as well. For a discussion of the relevant cases, see Stuntz,
Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 561-65.
91. Daniel Richman, The Right Fight, Boston Rev., Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005, at 6, 7
[hereinafter Richman, Right Fight].
92. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Law Enforcement
Officers, 2002, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fleo02.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
93. Id.
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States Attorneys' offices around the country, 9 4 or by the smaller number
of prosecutors in Main Justice. 95
No federal agency has the manpower to make even a sizeable dent in
the criminal activity that falls within its statutory jurisdiction. Hence the
need for selection mechanisms. Just about every federal prosecution carries with it a story about why the case went federal. It may be as theatrical
as Eliot Ness's targeting of Al Capone. Or as personal as "the fraud victim
decided to call the FBI instead of the local police, and the agent who
answered the phone thought the case sounded interesting." Or as institutional as a federal program in which all predicate felons whom the local
police catch with a gun in a designated high-crime area are charged in
federal court. 96 But-outside of a few highly specialized areas-there will
be some story that goes beyond the fact that the defendant committed a
crime falling within federal jurisdiction.
For evidence of how robust expectations of federal enforcement discretion are, one need go no farther than the nearest bank, where stickers
proclaim the FBI's commitment to going after bank robbers. Bank robberies were recently on the rise. 97 Yet instead of increasing its deployment in this area, the Bureau actually reduced it, leaving state and local
police to pick up the slack. 98 The stickers remain, understood more as a
vague expression of interest than a real commitment. Such understandings surely apply to the ubiquitous FBI warnings-on videos, and soon

94. See Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States
Attorneys' Annual Statistical Report 2 (2002), available at http://usdoj.gov/usao/reading_
room/reports/asr2002/02 stat book.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(reporting 5,304 assistant U.S. attorneys).
95. See generally Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 56 (examining
the working interaction between prosecutors and law enforcement agents).
96. See Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law
Enforcement Authority, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 369, 379 (2001) [hereinafter Richman, Project
Exile] (describing development of "Project Exile" in Richmond, Virginia, in 1997, which
provided for federal prosecution of every gun arrest by the local police for which there was
federal jurisdiction).
97. See Abraham McLaughlin, Bank Bandits Move In as Busy FBI Retreats, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Apr. 18, 2002, at 3 (reporting that nationwide bank robberies rose from 6,599
in 1999 to 7,217 in 2000 to 8,259 in 2001); Jodi Wilgoren, Robbers Rediscovering the
Small-Town Bank, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2002, at 1 (noting that bank robberies rose 82% in
small towns and 27% in unincorporated rural areas, compared to 17% overall).
98. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, As Cities Struggle, Police Get By with Less, N.Y. Times,
July 27, 2004, at A10 (noting the increasing pressure on local police departments due to
budget cuts and increased responsibility); Gary Fields & John R. Wilke, FBI's New Focus
Places Burden on Local Police, Wall St. J., June 30, 2003, at Al (reporting that "police
departments across the country must fill the void left by reassigned FBI agents"); Akilah
Johnson, FBI Passing on Bank Robberies, S. Fla. Sun-Sentinel, June 21, 2004, at 1B ("The
FBI's shift from fighting such crimes as drugs and white-collar offenses to
counterintelligence and counter-terrorism means there are fewer agents to investigate
bank robberies-a job increasingly being left to local police.").
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CDs-to potential digital pirates.99 The FBI does pursue some such
cases, 10 0 but expectations of extreme selectivity give the agency the luxury
of simultaneously "selling" its intellectual property for political gain and
avoiding the massive resource commitment that would come with having
a real "beat" in this area.
This extreme disjunction between federal jurisdiction and federal resources has bred a norm of radical underenforcement. The norm is selfreinforcing. It reduces the cost to Congress of adding more crimes to the
federal code, 10 1 which in turn adds to the degree of underenforcementand gives agents and prosecutors still more options, more crimes to pursue or not as they wish. The peculiar structure of the federal
prosecutorial establishment reinforces this front-line discretion. The U.S.
Attorneys' offices that bring the huge majority of federal criminal cases
are, in theory, under the control of Main Justice. Officials in different
administrations periodically try to assert that control. 10 2 They regularly
fail. Field offices preserve their independence by leveraging their connections to local officials and by playing off supervision by Main Justice
against oversight by Congress.
Nor are federal prosecutors constrained by meaningful performance
measures. Crime rates, either measured by the FBI's crime index or by
victimization surveys, offer important information about how well local
law enforcers are doing their jobs. No equivalent exists for federal officials. Partly, that is because most federal crimes are primarily the job of
those local officials. Where expectations of federal activity are greater,
the measures of criminal activity are far more elusive. This was one lesson
of the Savings and Loan scandals of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
value of collateral plummeted and banks failed. Some of this could be
attributed to criminal fraud, but how much? 10 3 The same question can
be asked of the current wave of corporate scandals. Many have been
prosecuted as a result,' 04 but how can the public or Congress judge
99. See, e.g., Paul Bond, FBI Pumps Up Warning Volume in Get-Tough Policy on
Pirating, Chi. Sun-Times, Feb. 21, 2004, at 30; Jeff Leeds, FBI Logo to Grace Music CDs,
L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 2004, at CIO.
100. E.g., Justin Fenton, FBI Seizes Computer of UM Student in Raid: Search at
Fraternity House Part of Vast Piracy Sweep, Balt. Sun, Apr. 24, 2004, at lB.
101. See Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 87, at 765-66 & n.40 (describing
how the Justice Department and FBI used existing statutes when they made white-collar
crime a priority in the mid-1970s).
102. Id. at 781.
103. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-1088, at 18-20 (1988) (criticizing Justice Department for
insufficient zeal in prosecuting fraud cases arising out of the savings and loan crisis); Henry
N. Pontell & Kitty Calavita, The Savings and Loan Industry, in Beyond the Law: Crime in
Complex Organizations (18 Crime & Just.) 203 (Michael Tonry & Albert J. Reiss eds.,
1993) (arguing that crime and fraud played a major role in the savings and loan crisis).
104. See Corporate Fraud Task Force, First Year Report to the President 2.2 (July 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/firstyear..report.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (recounting corporate fraud prosecutions in 2002-2003); see also
Corporate Task Force, Second Year Report to the President 3.2-3.15 (July 20, 2004),
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whether the federal government has overshot or undershot the mark in
its criminal enforcement response? 0 5 To ask the question is to recognize
that it cannot be satisfactorily answered.
Those who take an interest in monitoring the performance of federal enforcers are hard pressed to ascertain levels of activity and effectiveness. They still try. Indeed, those who take the insouciance with which
Congress passes substantive criminal law statutes as the sole measure of its
interests in the area sorely underestimate the degree to which Congress
monitors and endeavors to influence enforcement performance and priorities. 10 6 Yet federal enforcers do have considerably more flexibility
than their local cousins when it comes to how they account for their
performance.
Back in the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, the FBI under J.
Edgar Hoover was able to bulk up agency statistics by referring a lot of
cases for prosecution under the federal Dyer Act, which covered interstate car thefts.010 7 U.S. Attorneys would occasionally balk at taking these
"cheap" cases,' 8 but they constituted between a sixth and an eighth of all
federal prosecutions from 1964 to 1970.109 The combination of
prosecutorial resistance-particularly in large cities where U.S. Attorneys'
offices thought they had better things to do' 1 0 -and the end of the Hoover era, however, soon led to a massive shift in FBI resources. Without
resistance from Congress, Director Clarence Kelley was able to launch a
"quality case program" in 1975, under which the statistics touted by Hoover sharply declined."1 Kelley explained the decline by noting an increased emphasis on white-collar and organized crime investigations and
conceded that there was "no way to precisely measure the benefits of this
change in investigative emphasis."' 12 But that was enough.
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/2nd-yr-fraud-report.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
105. See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of
Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 937, 973 (2003) ("Depending
solely upon criminal law to control corporate crime is misguided, at best."); Stephen
Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in White-Collar Crime, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 2002, at I (noting a marked increase in white-collar crimes).
106. See Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 87, at 789-93.
107. SeeJames Q. Wilson, The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents 172
(1978) (recounting congressional testimony by Hoover boasting of "another record.., set
with the recovery of 32,076 automobiles").
108. James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the Political
and Legal Systems 22 (1978). One U.S. Attorney at the time defended his selectivity: "You
cannot prosecute every violation of the law that is brought to you ....
There were a lot of
cheap prosecutions available which could have just shot your statistics sky high, but would
have had no significant impact on things." Id.
109. Id. at 106 tbl.6.2.
110. See id. at 105.
111. Wilson, supra note 107, at 173-74.
112. Id. at 174.

20051

AL CAPONE'S REVENGE

The federal enforcement bureaucracy continues to struggle with the
tension between quality and quantity-the desire to use enforcement discretion to further broader programmatic or political (not necessarily partisan) goals against the desire to tout its achievements and justify additional funding. The tension is greatest in the white-collar area, where
demonstrations of a high level of activity carry the promise of political
gain and general deterrence. The Justice Department's annual Performance and Accountability Report, for example, doesn't even pretend to measure the effect of its fraud or corruption prosecutions on crime rates in
recites numbers of convictions and amounts of rethose areas. It simply
11 3
coveries and fines.
What happens when an enforcement bureaucracy has broad jurisdiction, is small enough to escape responsibility for going after every crime
(even every serious crime) within that jurisdiction, and wants to make as
big a splash as possible with its cases-for political, institutional, and personal gain? One thing that happens is the frequent reliance on Al
Capone-like strategies. Because federal enforcers can strategically invest
their resources, they have the luxury of looking into areas of possible
criminal activity before it is clear what, or whether, crimes have been
committed. A company restates its earnings and its stock price plummets.
A newspaper prints allegations of municipal corruption. These will require the expenditure of considerable investigative resources and often
sustained cooperation between agents and prosecutors.1 14 Along the
way, all sorts of statutory violations may turn up-offenses that fall far
short of the suspicions that first triggered the inquiry. Indeed, a new
crime occurs each time an interviewee lies to investigators.' 15 Needless to
say, such easy-to-prove crimes can often be generated with only modest
effort from the investigating agents.
The temptation to actually charge these add-on crimes grows as the
investigation progresses. The threat of charges, any charges-the more
easily proved, the better-pushes targets and witnesses alike to cooperate.
As time passes, the temptation to bring any provable charge against the
main target will grow, as an enforcer looking to move on to the next case
(and to reap the personal and professional rewards of having obtained a
conviction) sees little marginal gain from further investigative investments. The pressure to bring any provable charge will be even greater if

113. See Office of the Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, FY 2003 Performance and
Accountability Report, Pt. 2, Strategic Goal Two: Enforce Federal Criminal Laws (Jan.
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2003/pdf/p2sg2.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
114. See generally Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 56 (describing
dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal enforcement agents).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (criminalizing false statements on any matter within
the jurisdiction of a federal agency).
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reports of the investigation appear in the media, and papers are sold by
116
asking whether and when "X" is going to be indicted.
The pressure to bring any provable charge against a previously identified target has also led federal prosecutors to push the substantive law to
relax the burden of proof. This is not a uniquely federal phenomenon.
Legislation criminalizing the possession of burglars' tools, for example,

does the same thing and can be found in state penal codes.1 17 But prosecutions under those state laws seem to be rare. Cases brought under
equivalent federal statutes are common. Sometimes federal prosecutors
creatively develop new charging doctrines-without waiting for legislative
action-that eliminate the need to prove elusive facts. The fact that a
local official sold his discretionary power for personal gain no longer
needs to be proved; only that he took money without reporting it. That
constitutes mail fraud, because it deprives the citizenry of the intangible
right to his honest services (and inevitably someone, somewhere along
the way, mailed a letter).11 8 Obviously, federal prosecutors would prefer
this theory to one requiring them to prove some quid pro quo. The readiness of federal courts to accept the theory is less obvious, but as Ralph
Winter has noted, favorable facts-the whiff of corruption that attracted
the prosecutor's attention to begin with-go a long way.1 19 Only the Supreme Court, the court least likely to focus on the facts, balked at the
theory. 120 And it was thereafter overruled by Congress, 121 which, as Bill
Eskridge has shown, overrules only Court decisions that narrow federal
12 2
criminal statutes, never decisions that broaden those statutes.
116. See Oesterle, supra note 18, at 451 ("Prosecutors in complex business scandal
cases now seem quite content to turn to sideshow prosecutions very quickly in order to sate
public pressure for justice and to avoid the high risks of a main show prosecution.").
117. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 466 (West 1999) (including specifically crowbars and
screwdrivers among the banned tools).
118. Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the
Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 Geo. L.J. 1171, 1176 (1977).
119. See Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 Duke L.J. 945, 955-56 (1993) (citing
instances where proof of failure to disclose has led courts to find violations of federal
criminal law statutes); see also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal
Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 479-80 (1996) (discussing prosecutors' "power of initiative").
120. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (rejecting intangible
rights theory). For a more recent case in which the Supreme Court rejected an intangible
property theory previously accepted by lower courts, see Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for
Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) (reinstating intangible rights theory).
122. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 343-53 (1991) (describing "characteristics of Supreme Court
decisions that render them most likely to be overridden"). Eskridge found that criminal
law cases were the largest single category of congressional overrides, at 18%. Id. at 344
tbl.4. The federal government was the most common beneficiary of congressional
overrides (25%), while criminal defendants were among the least common (2%). Id. at
348 tbl.7.
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The use of a theory as baroque as intangible rights deprivation to go
after something as straightforward as bribery is not a product simply of
prosecutors' desire to cut evidentiary corners. It is also a result of the oftnoted constitutional limitations on federal criminal jurisdiction. When
federal prosecutors started to use the mail fraud statute to go after local
corruption, there was no federal bribery statute covering nonfederal officials. 1 23 A federal bribery statute was thereafter passed, but it required
proof of some nexus-the precise nature of which has yet to be worked
out in the courts124-to federal funding. Notice the disjunction between
the conduct that seems worthy of prosecution-to the public, to Congress, and to prosecutors themselves-and the constitutional doctrines
supporting federal jurisdiction. That disjunction means that federal
crimes will rarely have public definitions, even when the crime is a federalized version of some traditional state law crime like bribery. Federal
jurisdictional elements thus serve mainly to make federal crimes more
complex. Virtually all federal crimes are a combination of the core prohibited conduct and the conduct that brings the case within the scope of
federal power-and those two things are generally unrelated. "Fraud"
might mean something to ordinary voters, but "mail fraud" likely will not.
"Bribery" will; "federal program bribery" will not (particularly when the
connection to a federal program is far from clear). The list goes on.
All of which means that, while a state legislature might not feel free
to redefine core crimes, Congress can do so. Intangible rights mail fraud
is the classic example; there are many others. Consider the Travel Act,
whose sole conduct element is crossing a state line. 12 5 The substance of
the crime lies in the intent term: It covers travelers who pass between
states with the purpose of committing or assisting the commission of various state law crimes, including minor ones such as gambling. No federal
enforcement agency could possibly enforce such a statute systematically,
any more than the federal government could identify all those who deprive someone of "the intangible right of honest services.' 26 Such statutes define not crimes but hooks, legal forms that authorize legal punish-

123. To be sure, the government might have used either the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951, which covers "extortion," oddly defined to include bribery, see infra note 167, or
the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which criminalizes the use of "any facility in interstate or
foreign commerce" with intent to commit a wide range of state or federal crimes, including
bribery.
124. For the Court's latest effort at working out the precise nature of the nexus
between bribery and federal funding, see Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1945-46
(2004).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 1952. The Travel Act was the centerpiece of the anti-Mafia legislative
program put forward by the KennedyJustice Department. See Nancy E. Marion, A History
of Federal Crime Control Initiatives, 1960-1993, at 28-30 & tbl.2.3 (1994). It was selfconsciously designed for pretextual targeting-for catching a category of criminals, not
defining a type of banned conduct.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
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ment but do not explain orjustify it. The reasons for that punishment lie
outside the law.
Anyone who reads a fair number of federal indictments has seen this
phenomenon in action. While these indictments are not quite exercises
in Law French, their operative charging language often seems thoroughly
divorced from the worst aspects of the alleged conduct. If the strained
language of federal law does not clearly announce why someone deserves
to go to prison, the temptation for prosecutors to pick the most accommodating statute, to care less about what is being charged than about
whether a conviction can be obtained, becomes even greater.
In such a system, Capone-style tactics are the rule, not the exception.
Local criminal law enforcement is primarily a "what" enterprise; the goal
is to go after particular classes of conduct. Federal law enforcement is
more a "who" enterprise: The goal is to nail given (always shifting) classes of offenders. That wouldn't work locally, because local officials would
be punished for ignoring the "what." For federal officials, no equivalent
system of accountability exists.
III. PRETEXT AND TERRORISM

Enter terrorism. Terrorism is something the public cares about (to
put it mildly) and hence pays attention to-it's like homicide (indeed, it
often is homicide), not like mail fraud. It also has a public definition:
politically or religiously motivated violence against civilians. And, importantly, it has an external measure. Like FBI index crimes, terrorist attacks
are carefully counted, notjust nationally but internationally, with considerable attention paid to such data, as we saw in June 2004, when the State
Department took heavy criticism for undercounting. t 27 And terrorism,
particularly of the international variety, is something for which the federal government is plainly responsible. To be sure, the feds cannot meet
the threat by themselves. 128 But the FBI is plainly "on the hook" if a
terrorist attack occurs, in a way that is untrue of just about any other
publicly recognized crime.
The catastrophic nature of the September 11 attacks has changed
the federal playing field still more. Now we are unwilling to wait for attacks to occur; we demand that federal enforcement agencies work to
prevent them from happening, not just by improving their intelligence
capabilities but by prosecuting the terrorists before they actually strike.
The Justice Department agrees, and its top officials have regularly made
"prevention" a mantra to justify their requests for additional powers and
to explain what has become a massive redeployment of resources away
127. See R. Jeffrey Smith, State Dept. Concedes Errors in Terror Data, Wash. Post,
June 10, 2004, atA17; U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (rev.June 22,
2004), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/33771.htm (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
128. See Richman, Right Fight, supra note 91, at 7 (describing the federal
government's need for state and local assistance in the fight against terrorism).
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from other areas. 12 9 And it has invoked Al Capone to show the extent of
130
its commitment to use every possible tool against the terrorists.
But, of course, therein lies the problem, for this strategy has made it
exceedingly hard to tell what success the feds have had against the threat
of terrorism, or even whether the people so prosecuted have any relationship to terrorism at all. The prosecutions the government has brought
under the "material assistance" statute (first enacted in 1996, and given
more teeth by the USA PATRIOT Act)13 1 have not been without controversy. 132 And the government's interpretation of the statute's mens rea
element may allow the conviction of people who were not fully aware that
they were aiding a terrorist group. Yet the statute does at least demand
that a connection to terrorism (on the part of the organization) be
shown, either judicially or administratively. The same cannot be said
about "terrorism-related" prosecutions for crimes that lack any terrorism
element.
The nature of the crimes believed to be characteristic of terrorists
and their supporters has made the challenge of assessing preventive prosecutions even harder. The 9/11 plotters made use of false identification
documents.1 3 3 The use of such documents will often be a federal crime,
but every prosecution of such conduct can hardly be ascribed to the War
on Terror. Nor can all prosecutions of other kinds of criminal activity
that, according to federal authorities, have been used to support terrorist
groups: "stealing and reselling baby formula, illegally redeeming huge
129. See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Audit Rep. No. 03-37,
Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/audit/FBI/0337/final.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Audit Report No.
04-39, The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization (Sept.
2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/audit/FBI/0439/final.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, No. GAO-04-578T, FBI
Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Effort to Transform and Address
Priorities 20-33 (Mar. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04578t.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter GAO, FBI Transformation].
130. Gail Gibson, Al-Qaida Battle Likened to Mob Fight: Officials Say Strategy Used
Against Mafia Could Work on Terrorists, Bait. Sun, Oct. 29, 2001, at 6A; Kevin Sack,
Chasing Terrorists or Fears?, L.A. Times, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al.
131. See USA PATRIOT Act §§ 803, 805, 810, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339, 2339A, 2339B (Supp.
1I 2003).
132. See United States v. Afshari, No. 02-50355, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26430 (9th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2004) (upholding indictment charging material support in form of charitable
contributions); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 404-05
(9th Cir. 2003) (addressing vagueness of prohibition of material support in the form of
"training" and "personnel"), vacated en banc by Nos. 02-55082, 02-55083, 2004 US App.
LEXIS 26530 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2004); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2003) (suggesting that
the statute may violate the "guilt by association" principle and that "the distinction between
association and material support is illusory").
133. 9/11 Commission, Staff Statement No. 1, Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the
United States 2 (Jan. 26, 2004), available at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/staff_
statements/staff statement_1.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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quantities of grocery coupons, collecting fraudulent welfare payments,
13 4
swiping credit numbers and hawking unlicensed T-shirts."'
The Bush Administration has had middling success dealing with the
problem. In December 2001, a PhiladelphiaInquirer article-drawing on
data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)135
alleged that the Justice Department had overstated its statistics for terrorism cases and convictions in order, among other things, to justify its
budget request. 13 6 A General Accounting Office (GAO) inquiry conducted in response to these allegations found that, of 288 convictions
classified by the Justice Department as terrorism related for the fiscal year
2002, at least 132 had been misclassified, and the "overall accuracy of the
remaining 156 convictions is questionable. ' 137 In itsJanuary 2003 report,
the GAO chided the Justice Department: "Without reliable terrorism related conviction data, DOJ and the Congress's ability to accurately assess
terrorism related performance outcomes of our criminal justice system
and the results of efforts to combat terrorism will be limited."1 38 And
critics accused the Justice Department of "blur[ring] the line between
terrorists and common criminals" and deliberately "sabotag[ing]" antiter13 9
rorism efforts.
At a March 2003 House Appropriations hearing, Attorney General
Ashcroft noted that "212 criminal charges" had been brought "related to
terrorism" and "108 convictions or guilty please [sic]" obtained." When
pressed as to whether the charges had been related to terrorism, Ashcroft
responded that "these are individuals that we believe are related to terrorism. The criminal charges are not all-some of the criminal charges are
related, for example, to document fraud." 1 40 At an October 2003 Senate
134. John Mintz & Douglas Farah, Small Scams Probed for Terror Ties: Muslim, Arab
Stores Monitored as Part of Post-Sept. 11 Inquiry, Wash. Post, Aug. 12, 2002, at Al.
135. On its website, the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC")
identifies itself as "a data gathering, data research and data distribution organization
associated with Syracuse University." TRAC, About Us, at http://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRAC
general.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see Amy
Jeter, Finding That Federal Data Online, Am. Journalism Rev., Sept. 1998, available at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3449 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
136. Mark Fazlollah & Peter Nicholas, U.S. Overstates Arrests in Terrorism, Phila.
Inquirer, Dec. 16, 2001, at Al; see also Mark Fazlollah & Peter Nicholas, Justice
Department Inflates Terror Conviction Statistics, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 16, 2001, at
AO.
137. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, No. GAO-03-266, Justice Department: Better
Management Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to Ensure Accuracy of TerrorismRelated Statistics 6 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03266.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
138. Id. at 14.
139. Alexander Gourevitch, Body Count: How John Ashcroft's Inflated Terrorism
Statistics Undermine the War on Terrorism, Wash. Monthly, June 2003, at 37, 39.
140. Fiscal Year 2004 Appropriations for the Justice Department: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State & Judiciary of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, Mar. 6, 2003, (colloquy between Attorney General Ashcroft and Rep. Jose
Serrano), LEXIS, FDCH Political Transcript.
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Judiciary hearing, the Chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division
stepped gingerly around the issue. He asserted that "[s]ince the attacks
of September 11th, we've charged 284 defendants as the result of terrorism investigations,"1 41 but quickly qualified that assertion:
[T]here are a number of terrorism investigations where the decision that is made at the charging stage to charge the defendant with a non-terrorism crime in order to protect ... national
security and classified information that may be exposed, sources
and methods and that sort of thing, that may be jeopardized by
the criminal discovery that would ensue if we were to charge the
14 2
terrorism offense.
The issue reared its head again in December 2003, when TRACwhose efforts to ascertain federal enforcement patterns have created
quite a stir in a system accustomed to vague federal claims of "priorities"-issued another analysis of departmental data. Looking at terrorist
or antiterrorist referrals since September 30, 2001, this one found that
only 879 people had been convicted, and only 373 of those were sentenced to prison, most for quite short terms. TRAC noted:
[L] ooking at several more of the small number of "terrorism"
cases that resulted in sentences of five or more years, it is clear
that as defined by the government terrorism covers a lot more
than an attempt to blow up an airplane. If properly implemented, this broader definition of terrorism may be a useful way
for the government and the public to understand what is being
done and not done in this sensitive area. If improperly used,
however, the mis-labeling of cases could undermine the legitimacy of government efforts by turning the "terrorist" label into
a convenient method to justify government actions sought for
other purposes. If that happens, it also could undermine the
effort of the courts to treat defendants in a fair and just way and
make judging the effectiveness of the government extremely
143
difficult.
The Justice Department did not even wait for the formal release date
of the TRAC report for its chief spokesman, Mark Corallo, to fire back.
As Corallo explained:
TRAC's methodology and analysis simply is not compatible
with the reality of the Justice Department's efforts to prevent
terror in the 21st century. In fact, the TRAC study ignores the
value of early disruption of potential terrorist acts by proactive
prosecution of terrorism-related targets on less serious charges.
141. Criminal Terrorism Investigations and Prosecutions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 21, 2003, (testimony of Christopher Wray), LEXIS, Federal
News Service Transcript.
142. Id.
143. TRAC, Criminal Terrorism Enforcement Since the 9/11/01 Attacks (Dec. 8,
2003), at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/report031208.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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This strategy has proven to be an effective method of deterring
and disrupting potential terrorist acts.
Years ago, the government knew Al Capone was a powerful
organized crime boss, yet we prosecuted him with tax evasion to
remove him from the streets. Today, in order to protect the
lives of Americans at the earliest opportunity, the government
may charge potential terror suspects with lesser offenses to remove them from our communities. The fact that many terrorism investigations result in less serious charges does not mean
the case is not terrorism-related. Moreover, pleas to these less
serious charges often result in defendants who cooperate and
provide invaluable information to the government-information that can lead to the detection and prevention of other terrorism-related activity....
Often, there is no clear line between terrorism and other
criminal activity such as money laundering, identity theft, visa
fraud, or immigration violations. So-called "sleepers" are difficult to identify as they seek to blend in with minimal illegal activity until they are activated. This Administration's strategy of
preventing terrorism has helped protect America for over two
years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Our commitment
to preventing another attack on U.S. soil has not, and will not,
144
waver.
Corallo's statement captures the essence of the problem. Confronted with the greatest security challenge it has faced in recent years,
the federal law enforcement bureaucracy has turned to the strategy it
used to bring down Capone and dozens of other mob figures. And, indeed, that strategy is particularly well-suited to the War on Terror.
Among the hallmarks of the 9/11 plot and Al Qaeda operations generally
are low-profile cells of individuals who do not conspicuously violate the
law until they are ready to inflict catastrophic damage or assist those who
do. 1 45 To be sure, it is sometimes possible to grab terrorists at a point in
their planning such that the government can clearly prove their intentions and still neutralize the threat, as occurred when Sheik Abdel
Rahman and others who were prosecuted for plotting to blow up a number of New York City landmarks in 1993.146 Yet in that case, an FBI informant had infiltrated the group-a piece of investigative success that
can rarely be replicated.
144. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of Mark Corallo, Director of Public
Affairs, Regarding TRAC Study (Dec. 7, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2003/December/03_opa_670.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
145. See Statement of Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney, N.D. Ill., Before the
National Comm. on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Al Qaeda Panel 3, 6 (June
16, 2004), available at http://www.9-1Icommission.gov/hearings/hearingl2/pfitzgeraldstatement.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The al Qaeda network is . . .
effective because it has great patience ... and al Qaeda's cell structure may often provide
that the first evidence of a criminal intent may be the terrorist attack itself.").
146. United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).

20051

AL CAPONE'S REVENGE

If they can be criminally prosecuted before they strike, the provable
offenses of those seeking to commit terrorist acts will thus be relatively
minor. Bringing such cases can disrupt terrorist plans and provide leverage for the government to obtain cooperation from defendants; it can
also incapacitate targets without resort to material witness warrants, immigration detentions, and other noncriminal processes that (according to
some) are amenable to even greater misuse. Moreover, the government
can satisfy its discovery obligations without revealing valuable intelligence
(so long as it's not exculpatory) when it brings these stripped-down cases.
Yet this strategy has left the Administration hard pressed to demonstrate to Congress and the public that it has effectively used the massive
resources that have been committed to counterterrorism. Repeated assurances that the right people are being prosecuted for the right reasons,
and that terrorist plans are being foiled or "disrupted," have their limits
when such matters are not subject to any external check. Moreover,
emerging patterns of minor charges being brought against Arab Americans or Middle Eastern nationals, in the absence of proven terrorist links,
1 47
will surely provide grist for those disposed to claim ethnic profiling.
The point is not that the Justice Department should abandon the Al
Capone approach to counterterrorism prosecutions. After all, there may
be no realistic alternative. For prosecutors going after mobsters, the
Capone strategy was a convenience. For prosecutors trying to take down
would-be terrorists it is probably a necessity, given the near impossibility
of proving planned acts of terrorism before the plans bear their awful
fruit. And the downsides of strategic charging-especially the risk of a
rogue prosecutor going overboard while trying to make a name for himself-are substantially lower in terrorism cases due to the centralized control that Main Justice exercises in this area. 1 48 If ever Capone were a
model for prosecutors, it should be a model here.
But the Capone strategy does carry a price, and the price needs to be
better understood. For decades, federal prosecutors have worked in a
system that offered a host of strategic charging options, little clear responsibility, and no external performance measures. In that kind of system, prosecutors' incentives were to (1) select targets (based on whatever
criteria prosecutors wish to advance), (2) pursue whatever charges would
maximize the odds of conviction, and (3) claim success in the most ex147. See generally Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under
Attack, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1417-24, 1436-38 (2002) (discussing various efforts by
the Justice Department to interview thousands of Middle Eastern men ages eighteen to
thirty-three in order to gather information on terrorist organizations).
148. The precise role that MainJustice played in causing and curing misconduct in a
recent Detroit terrorism prosecution has yet fully to emerge. See Danny Hakim & Eric
Lichtblau, After Convictions, the Undoing of a U.S. Terror Prosecution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7.
2004, at Al (describing how, after a scathing internal inquiry, the Justice Department
moved to dismiss charges in case that officials had long touted as conspicuous success);
Richard Serrano & Greg Miller, Terrorism Case Shows U.S. Flaws in Strategy, L.A. Times,
Oct. 12, 2004, at Al (reporting on the implosion of the "seemingly brilliant prosecution").
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treme terms possible. Congress's incentive was to give prosecutors as
many charging options as possible. For some time now, everyone in this
dysfunctional system has been doing what comes naturally.
Doing what comes naturally is not a strategy for maximizing prosecutors' credibility over time, but then there was never much need to maximize credibility: There were no performance claims that the public or
congressional overseers cared deeply about. Now, prosecutors are living
in a different world. Terrorism is the Justice Department's chief responsibility. Voters and oversight committees care deeply about the question of
whether federal officials are meeting that responsibility. Credibility matters. The Justice Department would be much better off today had it let
Capone go, along with the bird-killing Mob defendant and assorted highprofile, white-collar targets of the last few decades.
Of course, that is water under the bridge. For now, the job is to find
ways to rebuild federal law enforcers' ability to send the right signal:
When we say we've taken down a terrorist, we truly have taken down a
terrorist. That means, among other things, reducing prosecutors' incentives to follow the Capone strategy everywhere else.
IV.

DISCOURAGING PRETEXTUAL PROSECUTION

So pretextual prosecution is indeed a problem, not of fairness, but of
political economy. This problem has no neat solution. Pretextual charging cannot be abolished-federal law enforcers may need it for the War
on Terror. But its use needs to be minimized in cases that do not involve
terrorism. How is that supposed to happen? To some degree, it may
already be happening. The key mechanism is accountability. Several important trends in federal criminal law enforcement push toward increasingly accountable and transparent policing and prosecution. Unfortunately, current trends in statutory interpretation and federal criminal
jurisdiction push the other way.
Recall the four factors that tend to minimize Capone-style prosecutions in state courts: a clear sphere of responsibility, constrained resources, external performance measures, and unstrategically defined
"core" crimes. At least in the recent past, none of those four features of
local prosecutors' offices has applied to federal prosecutors' offices. That
may be changing. A variety of forces are pushing toward clearer lines of
responsibility for federal law enforcement officials-especially for the
FBI. Consequently, those officials are operating under substantially
greater resource constraints than they have experienced in the past. Federal law enforcers are still not as constrained, either politically or financially, as their local counterparts, but the movement is very much in that
direction. Joint initiatives with federal and local officials working together (usually to deal with some form of criminal violence or drug
crime) may also impose greater political constraints on federal officials.
And at least in a couple of areas, federal law enforcers are increasingly
subject to external performance measures.
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These trends do not solve the pretext problem, though they are likely
to mitigate it, perhaps substantially. The fourth factor remains: A number of core federal crimes are defined strategically. That invites prosecution for a nominal "crime" distinct from the conduct that federal agents
and prosecutors are seeking to punish. Here, the solution does not lie in
promising enforcement trends but in changed legal doctrine. Ironically,
narrowing federal criminal liability rules would be easier if federal jurisdiction were broadened.
Begin with expanding federal enforcement responsibilities. In recent testimony before a House appropriations subcommittee, an FBI official highlighted the Bureau's need to "focus on those areas where there is
not a strong state or local presence in terms of criminal investigative
work." "[R]ight now," he continued, "that is counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and those major investigative areas in white collar crime, organized crime, public corruption, things that other people just don't
do. ' 149 Plainly, counterterrorism is the priority among priorities. At a
March 2004 Senate appropriations hearing, when asked why, with approximately 12,000 agents, the Bureau was "only dedicating 2,500 to the
effort," Director Mueller assured his questioner that the shift of even
more agents was being considered, and that agents doing criminal work
could always be pulled in, to ensure that every terrorism case gets addressed. 150 A recent GAO study shows that agents indeed spent less time
on violent and white-collar crime cases than was originally allocated, as
they were redirected to counterterrorism-related matters 1 5 1-a sign that
resource constraints are hitting the FBI in a way they haven't before.
The priority extends to prosecutors as well. In July 2004, the Maryland U.S. Attorney inartfully told his staff that by November 6 (four days
after the general election), he wanted "Three 'Front Page' White Collar/
149. Transformation of the FBI Following 9/11: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Justice, State & Judiciary of the House Comm. on Appropriations, June 3,
2004, (testimony of John Pistole, Executive Asst. Director for Counterterrorism, FBI)
LEXIS, Federal News Service Transcript; see also FBI Oversight, Terrorism, and Other
Topics: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, May 20, 2004, (testimony of Robert
Mueller, Director, FBI), LEXIS, Federal News Service Transcript ("We're not doing as
many bank robberies. We're not doing the smaller white-collar criminal cases, the bank
embezzlements under a couple of hundred thousand.").
150. The Transformation of the FBI: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Justice, State &Judiciary of the S. Comm on Appropriations, Mar. 23, 2004, (testimony of
FBI Director Robert Mueller under questioning by Sen. Judd Gregg), LEXIS, Federal News
Service Transcript.
151. See GAO, FBI Transformation, supra note 129, at 29-31 (charting the
redirection of agents from other areas to counterterrorism). But see U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office, No. GAO-04-1036, FBI Transformation: Data Inconclusive on
Effects of Shift to Counterterrorism-Related Priorities on Traditional Criminal
Enforcement (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041036.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter GAO, Data Inconclusive] (describing as
"inconclusive" the data regarding "whether shifts in the priorities after September 11 have
had an effect on overall federal efforts to combat drug crime").
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Public Corruption Indictments" and that he was "embarrassed by the fact
that this office has not convicted an elected official of corruption since
1988."152 When the email became public, the Justice Department's
spokesman made clear for the record: "All of our United States attorneys
know that our top priority is fighting terrorism .... There are other important issues such as public corruption, yes, but our top priority is the
prevention of terrorist attacks and I'm sure that the U.S. attorney in Mary1 53
land is well aware of that. 1
Outside the terrorism area, the scope of federal responsibility is less
clear-and the picture is complicated by the growing opportunity cost of
counterterrorism efforts. Congress seems not to recognize that this opportunity cost exists; the congressional message to federal law enforcement has been to do more of everything. The pressure to go after all
forms of white-collar crime remains strong-indeed, that pressure has intensified since the Enron and WorldCom scandals. So does the pressure
to investigate and prosecute government corruption. 15 4 And Congress
continues to press for more federal involvement in violent crime cases. A
May 2003 hearing gave members of the Senate Judiciary Committee a
chance to celebrate Project Safe Neighborhoods-the Administration's
umbrella term for a variety of local programs that use federal agents and
prosecutors against gun violence. 155 And, in June 2004, a bipartisan
group of senators gained Judiciary Committee approval for the Criminal
Street Gang Abatement Act, which would target "criminal street gangs"
(loosely defined) with new offenses, higher sentences, and additional federal resources. 1 56 One needs to look long and hard (and with more success than we have had) to find any evidence of a former priority that
legislators or law enforcers have abandoned since 9/11.
This unwillingness to relinquish any federal responsibility, coupled
with the demands of the criminal justice "front" on the War on Terror,
152. Doug Donovan, DiBiagio Voices Frustration over Pace of Top Cases, Balt. Sun,
July 15, 2004, at IA.
153. Id.; see also Doug Donovan & Laura Sullivan, Democrat Demands DiBiagio
Resign, Balt. Sun, July 16, 2004, at IA; Eric Rich, Md. Prosecutor Accused of Playing
Politics, Wash. Post, July 16, 2004, at BI. In immediate response to the leaked email,
Deputy Attorney General James Comey, citing the need to protect "the credibility of this
Department, particularly in matters involving public corruption," ordered that no
corruption indictments go forward in Maryland without his personal approval. Doug
Donavan, DiBiagio Gets Formal Rebuke from His Boss, Bait. Sun, July 17, 2004, at IA.
Citing "family" reasons, DiBiagio has since announced that he will not be seeking
reappointment as U.S Attorney in 2005. Stephanie Hanes, U.S. Attorney DiBiagio Resigns,
Balt. Sun, Dec. 4, 2004, at 1A.
154. See Marsha Shuler, FBI Plans Task Force in BR Area: Public Corruption
Targeted, Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), May 11, 2004, at IA (reporting that Republican
congressman running for Senate in Louisiana took credit for establishment of a six agent
FBI public corruption task force).
155. Project Safe Neighborhoods: America's Network Against Gun Violence:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
156. S. 1735, 108th Cong. (2004).
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leaves federal law enforcers substantially more resource constrained. Another kind of constraint arises from the still-growing federal commitment
to fighting violent crime. 15 7 For the most part, that commitment is
played out through partnerships between federal officials and local law
enforcement personnel. Any time federal and local officials work together on some governance matter, the tendency is to assume that federal officials are driving the train. But in this setting-where only the
local cops generally know who ought to be targeted, and decide which
arrests should be pursued federally-the assumption may not hold. More
likely, the political factors that constrain local officials also constrain their
federal partners when the two groups work together on crimes that fall
within the locals' sphere of primary responsibility. The result is a trade:
The locals get federal dollars and considerable say in which cases get
prosecuted; the feds have to work within the bounds of local political
accountability. 158 That tradeoff cuts down on the risk from pretextual
targeting. The local thug singled out for prosecution for the easily
proven federal offense of being a felon in possession of a weapon 159 may
feel aggrieved. But the reason for his selection will likely have some connection to a comprehensive local enforcement strategy. The outlines of
the federal end of this strategy will often emerge with a clarity not found
in other areas, as federal prosecutors working in close collaboration with
local authorities find themselves under considerable pressure to an160
nounce precisely what kinds of cases they will take.
At least in some respects, the Justice Department has embraced this
accountability. Consider the "Violent Crime Reduction Initiative" that
the Attorney General announced in June 2004. This initiative involves
teams of federal agents and prosecutors assigned to fifteen cities to work
with the local authorities targeting violent crime. The idea is an exten157. See GAO, Data Inconclusive, supra note 151, at 18-20 (finding that violent crime
referrals to U.S. Attorneys' offices increased by 29% between 2001 and 2003 because
increased activity by ATF more than offset the decreased FBI activity in the area).
158. See Richman, Project Exile, supra note 96, at 403 (discussing advantages and
disadvantages to "letting federal, state, and local enforcers in each district negotiate the
boundaries of their interaction without legislative inference").
159. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000); see also Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States:
Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 939, 943-44 (1997)
(discussing ease of conviction for the offense).
160. A recent study noted:
[S]tanding Federal-local task forces necessarily involve prosecutors and
investigative agents in potentially more sophisticated cases, larger caseloads, and a
more structured organizational environment .... They also must contend with an
urban landscape whose interlocking crime and law enforcement patterns are
dense and complex, and where greater scrutiny by other law enforcement
professionals (and the media) exists. These factors may tend to produce a
decisionmaking process that is likely less casual than elsewhere.
Malcolm Russell-Einhorn et al., Federal-Local Law Enforcement Collaboration in
Investigating and Prosecuting Urban Crime, 1982-1999: Drugs, Weapons, and Gangs 113
(May 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/grants/201782.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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sion of Project Safe Neighborhoods; what's new is the clarity of the mission. The goals of the initiative, according to the head of ATF, "are to
decrease, within six months, the number of homicides, number of firearms related to homicides, number of violent crimes and number of violent firearms crimes." 16 1 The risk with these programs has always been
that local officials (supported by their members of Congress) would turn
them into unlimited draws on federal resources.1 62 Given that risk, ATF's
specification of these parameters is notable evidence that the government
is voluntarily taking on the kind of scrutiny that organizations like TRAC
bring to its conduct in the terrorism context.
Such precommitment strategies cannot work everywhere. Particularly in the white-collar crime area, demonstrating precisely what law enforcers have accomplished remains a large challenge. The temptation is
to dodge the challenge by pointing to the defendants' exalted positions
on corporate or political ladders, thereby deflecting attention from the
charged offense. Yet as the opportunity cost for each prosecution
grows-that is what the growing emphasis on terrorism (and corporate
crime, and violent crime) means-the Justice Department will need to do
better than simply counting the number of politicians and business executives who lost their jobs due to criminal investigations. Growing resource constraints, the rise of organizations like TRAC that can contradict grandiose law enforcement claims, the increasing number and
importance of federal-local partnerships, and the growing sense of federal responsibility for particular crime problems (including but not limited to terrorism)-all these things are likely to push federal officials toward a focus on crimes rather than criminals and toward unstrategic
charging practices rather than pretextual ones.
Right now, the biggest obstacle to this healthy state of affairs is the
law. Too many federal crimes-including offenses that are regularly
prosecuted; this is notjust a matter of doctrinal technicality-are defined
both broadly and strategically (not the same thing). Instead of specifying
the conduct that law enforcers or legislators actually wish to punish, these
statutes seem designed to facilitate convictions in cases where the real
crime lies somewhere else. "Fraud" in federal criminal law covers a wide
and diverse array of corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors. 163 The federal false statements statute covers concealment, not just
161. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Justice Department Announces New Violent
Crime Reduction Initiative (June 24, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2004/June/04_ag_438.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see Jonathan D. Silver,
City Takes Aim at Gun Crimes; Federal Partnership Expected to Result in Stiffer Sentences,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 12, 2004, at B4.
162. See Richman, Project Exile, supra note 96, at 401 (citing Democrats' concerns
that such programs would result in "fewer federal resources for Washington to deploy
against targets that only Washington had the means (and possibly the inclination) to
pursue").
163. The key provision is 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which states simply: "For the purposes of
this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
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lies;' 6 4 it also covers unadorned false denials of guilt, even where no one
was misled by the denial. 165 "Extortion" includes street robberies, 166 accepting bribes, 167 and blackmail. 168 Money laundering covers pretty
much any handling of money or property that is connected to criminal
activities. 169 And federal sentences, especially for anything related to
guns or drugs, are infamously severe. 170 All this amounts to an invitation
to federal agents and prosecutors to look on federal crimes and sentences
not as laws that define criminal conduct and its consequences but as a
menu that defines prosecutors' options. Federal law enforcers decide
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." For the best discussion of the
breadth of this statute, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. Rev. 193 (1991).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) includes within its coverage anyone who "falsifies,
conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact."
165. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 410 (1998) ("Thus, when the interview
ended, a federal offense had been completed-even though, for all we can tell, Brogan's
unadorned denial misled no one.").
166. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, covers "robbery" and "extortion." In United
States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978), the Court rejected the argument that only robbery
and extortion that constituted racketeering were covered by the Act:
Nothing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional intent to limit its
coverage to persons who have engaged in "racketeering." To the contrary, the
statutory language sweeps within it all persons who have "in any way or degree...
affect[ed] commerce... by robbery or extortion." 18 U.S.C. §1951 (a) (1976 ed.).
These words do not lend themselves to restrictive interpretation; as we have
recognized, they "manifest . . . a purpose to use all the constitutional power
Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion,
robbery or physical violence," Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).
Culbert, 435 U.S. at 373.
167. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 258-59 (1992) (holding that
public official's acceptance of a bribe constituted extortion under Hobbs Act).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 69 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying
federal extortion statute in blackmail prosecution of woman claiming to be Bill Cosby's
illegitimate daughter, who attempted to obtain money from him by threatening to tell the
tabloid press that he was her father).
169. See Jimmy Gurul6, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New
Federal Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of
Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 823, 824 (1995) (describing
broad definition of money laundering); Teresa E. Adams, Note, Tacking On Money
Laundering Charges to White Collar Crimes: What Did Congress Intend, and What Are
the Courts Doing?, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 531, 532-33 (2000) (describing wide range of
behavior used as basis for charging defendants with money laundering).
170. There are too many sources to cite for this proposition. For the best general
critique of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see generally Kate Stith &Jos6 A. Cabranes,
Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 7-8 (1998). For the best
discussion of the racial impact of federal drug sentences, see generally David A. Sklansky,
Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1283, 1285-97 (1995). And for an
interesting comparison between America's (and especially the federal system's) harsh
sentencing doctrines and the more lax sentences that prevail in Western Europe, see
generally James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening
Divide Between America and Europe 3-17 (2003).
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whom to send up the river, then select the appropriate items from the
menu in order to induce a guilty plea with the desired sentence. The
precise contours of the crime matter only insofar as they affect litigation
tactics or plea bargaining stances. Overly broad federal crimes and overly
harsh federal sentences-crime definition probably matters more than
too tough sentencing rules, though both matter-encourage a mindset
that makes criminal law enforcement an enterprise in targeting criminals,
not punishing crimes.
For evidence of the cost of that mindset, one need look no farther
than the history of criminal enforcement of the federal tax laws. The
success of the Capone case inspired a long tradition of tax prosecutions
against mobsters, drug dealers, and corrupt officials. While popular with
prosecutors gunning for elusive targets, these "illegal source" cases came
at a price: Ordinary tax cheats received little prosecutorial attention.
Since ordinary tax cheats knew this, the role of criminal tax enforcement
1 7
in curbing tax evasion was vastly diminished. 1
The solution is for federal criminal law to function like, say, the state
law of homicide. Murder and manslaughter statutes roughly define the
conduct that prosecutors actually punish; authorized sentences under
those statutes correspond to the sentences prosecutors actually wish to
impose on the defendants they prosecute.' 72 Consequently, prosecutors
use those statutes to punish the specified conduct-not to nail offenders
who are guilty of some other, harder-to-prove crime. The fact that so
much of federal criminal law falls so far short of that standard does little
harm to the legitimate interests of criminal defendants. Few innocents
are targeted by the FBI and United States Attorneys' offices (notice that
both entities have to agree on the targeting, which protects innocents
better than any realistic legal doctrine restricting charging decisions
could). 173 The harm, rather, goes to the political economy of federal law
171. See William H. Webster, Review of the Internal Revenue Service's Criminal
Investigation Division 11-17 (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/irs/ci/cistructure/websterreport.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (faulting I.R.S.
Criminal Investigation Division for giving insufficient attention to its primary mission of
promoting voluntary tax compliance and focusing too heavily on illegal source cases). In
the wake of the Webster review, the I.R.S. took measures to recenter its criminal efforts on
tax compliance. It remains to be seen whether the new focus on terrorist financing will
derail that effort. See Internal Revenue Service, FY 2004 Criminal Investigation Annual
Business Plan, available at http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/O,,id=
118127,00.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Criminal Investigation
Division's efforts, since Sept. 11, 2001, against domestic and international terrorism).
172. See Stuntz, Criminal Law's Shadow, supra note 49, at 2563-64 ("For crimes at
the top of the severity scale, law defines both criminal liability and punishment .... ").
173. See Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note 56, at 796 (noting how
separation of prosecutorial and investigative authority works to limit errors of
commission); see also C.F. Larry Heimann, Understanding the Challenger Disaster:
Organizational Structure and the Design of Reliable Systems, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 421, 427
(1993) (noting that serial systems, which require approval of several components prior to
agency action, are less prone to errors than parallel systems).
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enforcement. Voters and legislative overseers can best assess how well
prosecutors do their jobs in a world in which criminal law functions as
law, not as a menu. Criminals are most efficiently deterred when the
price of their crimes is publicly and transparently attributed to the crimes
that prompt their prosecutions. And federal prosecutors, for their part,have more credibility in a system where crimes are both defined and enforced unstrategically. That credibility, in turn, comes in handy in the
one area where the Capone strategy probably remains essential:
counterterrorism. Federal criminal law reform might (or might not) be a
boon to federal defendants. It is a necessity for the federal government.
Wise law reform need not mean a wholesale rewriting of Title 18 of
the federal code. 1 74 There is a great deal of room for productive change
around the edges of the doctrine, in the territory where federal courts
generally work. Unfortunately, current trends in the law of statutory interpretation and federal jurisdiction-two of those "around the edges"
territories-make productive change harder, not easier. Brogan v. United
States1 75 offers a good example. James Brogan was a corrupt union boss
who took bribes from employers to sell out his union members. There is
a federal labor racketeering statute that targets such conduct. 176 The FBI
agents investigating Brogan either were uncertain that he could be convicted of violating that statute or wanted to guarantee his cooperation in
their investigation. Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion describes what
happened next:
Two federal investigators paid an unannounced visit one evening to James Brogan's home. The investigators already possessed records indicating that Brogan, a union officer, had received cash from a company that employed members of the
union Brogan served. (The agents gave no advance warning,
one later testified, because they wanted to retain the element of
surprise .... ) When the agents asked Brogan whether he had
received any money or gifts from the company, Brogan responded "No." The agents asked no further questions. After
Brogan just said "No," however, the agents told him: (1) the
Government had in hand the records indicating that his answer
was false; and (2) lying to federal agents in the course of an
investigation is a crime. . . . Brogan divulged nothing more.
Thus, when the interview ended, a federal offense had been
completed-even though, for all we can tell, Brogan's
177
unadorned denial misled no one.
174. To get a sense of the challenges of wholesale reform in this area, see Charles R.
Wise, The Dynamics of Legislation: Leadership and Policy Change in the Congressional
Process 21-24 (1991). See generally Symposium, Toward a New Federal Criminal Code, 2
Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
175. 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2000).
177. Brogan, 522 U.S. at 409-10 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).
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Brogan was charged and convicted of both labor racketeering and
violating the federal "false statements" statute. The case made its way to
the Supreme Court on the question whether Brogan's "exculpatory no"
fell within the terms of the latter prohibition. By a vote of 7 to 2, the
Court held that it did, on the ground that the false statements statute had
17 8
no explicit exemption for unadorned denials of guilt.
By construing the false statements statute so broadly, the Brogan
Court made it easy for federal law enforcers to use that statute as a substitute for harder-to-prove labor racketeering charges. That muddies the
signals federal criminal litigation sends, and it makes federal law enforcement less transparent-to union bosses inclined to sell out their men, to
the voters, and to Congressional oversight committees. It would be better
for federal judges to raise the cost of prosecuting classic "detour" crimes
like false statements, perhaps by applying a strong form of the rule of
lenity to those crimes. In Brogan, the Court did exactly the opposite: It
made detour prosecutions cheaper and left the rule of lenity1 79 weaker.
The larger problem has to do with federal criminal jurisdiction.
Strict jurisdictional requirements are supposed to narrow federal criminal law. The actual effect is in the other direction; we would likely have
both narrower and more transparent federal criminal prohibitions if jurisdictional restrictions were relaxed. Take an example from the law of
public corruption. Obviously, someone in America's criminal justice system needs to police the honesty of state and local officials. Local district
attorneys are unlikely to do that job well, both because corruption cases
take a lot of time and manpower to develop, and because the DAs often
have close ties to would-be defendants. A functionalist approach to federalism would conclude that the FBI and U.S. Attorneys should handle this
class of crimes, that we should have a general federal bribery statute that
extends to all government officials. But the law of federal criminal jurisdiction is anything but functionalist. So we have bribery and gratuity statutes for federal officials;18 0 state and local government employees are
bound by a law that bans bribe-taking by those who work in government
178. Id. at 400-04, 406-08 (opinion of the Court); id. at 408-09 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented, relying on the fact
that the "exculpatory no" doctrine had won the adherence of the great majority of lower
federal courts that had considered the issue. Id. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. For the two best discussions of the rule of lenity, see generally Dan M. Kahan,
Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345; Zachary Price, The Rule
of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885 (2004). Both Kahan and Price
focus on the rule's effects on lawmakers and law enforcers, not on criminal defendants.
That runs contrary to the traditional view, which sees the rule as a means of ensuring that
individual defendants have "fair warning" of the crimes with which they are charged. For
the classic discussion, see generally Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal
Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1935).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (bribery); id. § 201(c) (gratuities). For the leading
case on the meaning of these statutes, see United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S.
398, 404-12 (1999).
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enterprises that receive more than $10,000 of federal money per year. 18 1
A large fraction of the litigation under this "program bribery" statute is
devoted to jurisdictional questions: What is the proper government entity for purposes of measuring the amount of federal aid received? What
nexus must there be between the federal money and the corrupt activity?1 8 2 All of this is both costly to prosecutors and a distraction from the
core enterprise of punishing corrupt politicians.
It gets worse. Before the program bribery statute, federal prosecutors used the "intangible rights" doctrine to make the mail and wire fraud
statutes into de facto bribery statutes.1 8 3 Even since the enactment of the
program bribery statute, they have continued to use the fraud laws
against local corruption,18 4 partly because of jurisdictional convenience.
That means a large fraction of federal bribery cases are prosecuted under
fraud statutes that (because they are fraud statutes, not bribery statutes)
do not require proof of a "quid pro quo"-the key element in most bribery cases. This arrangement has a number of serious problems. The least
of them is the subject that increasingly dominates the mail fraud literature: concerns about whether politician-defendants have "fair notice"
that they might be straying into legally questionable territory when they
take money on the sly. 1 85 Notice, vagueness, and the like may be serious
181. 18 U.S.C. § 666.
182. Cf. Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004), in which the Court rejected a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the program bribery statute, holding that
Congress acted within the scope of its power under the Spending Clause. It is not clear
what message Sabri conveys with respect to the nexus between federal money and the
bribery: The Court stressed the facial nature of the defendant's challenge, see id. at
1948-49, so the fate of as-applied challenges remains uncertain.
183. See Ruff, supra note 118, at 1181-86.
184. See Pub. Integrity Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report to Congress on the
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 2002, at 30-31, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/ARFinal_2002.pdf (last visitedJan. 31, 2005) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing federal case alleging fraud against local
government official).
185. For examples, see Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine: Someone to Watch over Us, 31 Harv.J. on Legis. 153, 190-97 (1994) ("The mail
fraud statute fails the notice test because the term 'honest services' does not clearly state
the content of criminal conduct."); Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by
Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 137, 151 (1990)
("The floating definition of 'a scheme to defraud' does not give fair notice to those
persons potentially subject to it."); Todd E. Molz, Comment, The Mail Fraud Statute: An
Argument for Repeal by Implication, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 983, 1000-02 (1997) ("The broad
language of the mail fraud statute fails to identify what conduct it outlaws."). Concerns
about vagueness have yielded a variety of proposals to limit the scope of "intangible rights"
fraud. For one of the more interesting examples, see generally Edward J. Imwinkelried &
Ephraim Margolin, The Case for the Admissibility of Defense Testimony About Customary
Political Practices in Official Corruption Prosecutions, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
Criticism of private sector mail fraud cases has tended to focus more on the economic
cost of overregulation. For the best example of such criticism, see Winter, supra note 119,
at 954-57.
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concerns in a few cases, but only in a few cases. 18 6 The bigger problem is
one of political structure. Neither voters nor members of Congress can
easily tell what the federal law enforcement bureaucracy is enforcing
when the description of crimes so poorly fits the conduct that is actually
punished. In a world where laws governing fraud, misrepresentation, and
bribery do not conform to the ordinary meaning of those terms, monitoring is impossible and strategic prosecution is inevitable.
Notice the combination of legal rules that produces this state of affairs. Courts are loath to impose even commonsensical restrictions on
substantive legal liability, as cases like Brogan suggest. 18 7 But those same
courts enforce jurisdictional elements strictly, thereby creating incentives
for prosecutors to seek and for Congress to supply jurisdictionally convenient catch-all crimes, which is what mail and wire fraud have become.
Prosecutors shop around for the most favorable jurisdictional grant. The
substance of the relevant crime becomes an afterthought.
And yet another problem arises out of the current judicial craze for
strict enforcement of jurisdictional elements. That kind of federalism
cuts across crimes, not between them. It thus defeats political responsibility
and accountability instead of reinforcing those goals. In a well-functioning system of criminal law enforcement, voters, politicians, and law enforcers would all know which officials are responsible for enforcing which
crimes. Bribery by state and local officials would either rest with local
district attorneys or with their federal counterparts. Jurisdictional analyses of the sort popular today, whether under the Spending Clause or the
Commerce Clause, create uncertainty; it is hard to tell which cases go
where. If local officials are corrupt, local voters don't know whom to
186. Cf. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(rejecting vagueness challenge to the federal "intangible rights" statute, where the
fraudulent scheme involved the payment of bribes to insurance adjusters to treat certain
claims more favorably). Notice that Rybicki involved a private actor, not a public official.
For a classic example of public sector "intangible rights" mail fraud that raises a colorable
vagueness claim, see United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 141-44 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Winter, J., dissenting). Oddly, federal judges seem especially inclined to worry about
vagueness in prosecutions of state government officials. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
concluded that "genuine difficulties of vagueness" would attend the mail fraud statute were
it applied to conduct not already barred by state law-and reached that conclusion in a
case involving a corrupt state administrative lawjudge. See United States v. Brumley, 116
F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Three dissenting judges would have gone farther
and barred mail fraud prosecutions of state officials altogether, partly due to vagueness
concerns. See id. at 736-47 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Judge Raggi, concurring in Rybicki,
pointed out why this marriage of vagueness doctrine and federalism is odd: A number of
state statutes use the same language as the federal "intangible rights" statute; so if the latter
is unconstitutionally vague, the same holds true of the former. See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 153
n.3 (Raggi, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing state statutes).
187. That same tendency is reinforced by the "dueling dictionaries" approach to
federal criminal statutes: When the meaning of some term is at issue, the side with the
most references wins; policy arguments go by the boards. For a striking example involving
the federal statute that deals with use of firearms to commit drug crimes, see Muscarello v.
United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127-32 (1998); id. at 139-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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blame. If politics is cleaner than it once was, voters don't know who deserves credit. That is not a healthy system.
Meanwhile, attention is diverted from two enterprises that need all
the attention they can get: defining crimes well, in a way that fairly captures the prohibited conduct without disabling prosecutors from proving
guilt, and allocatingcrimes well, so that local and federal prosecutors alike
can use their time and talents to the best advantage. Crime definition is a
hard and important task, with useful roles to be played by both members
of Congress and federaljudges. Over time, the best equilibrium is probably one in which Congress defines the general conduct terms, judges define exceptions and defenses (and, often, mens rea), and Congress reacts
when it disapproves of interstitial judicial lawmaking. For most of American history, that is how criminal law worked. But in the federal system for
the past few decades, it has worked very differently. Congress writes
broad criminal prohibitions, without exceptions or defenses, and judges
cannot touch them-save for their jurisdictional elements.
This problem extends well beyond public corruption cases. In the
mid-1990s, a wave of arsons hit black churches in the South.1 88 The federal government announced that it was going to take charge of that problem. 189 In a healthy legal system, such a move would generate applause:
The federal government was making itself responsible for an easily measurable crime, with officials unable to control the measurement process
and with media and public scrutiny of the results guaranteed. But instead
of encouraging this step, federal courts undermined it with a demanding
(and vague) construction of the arson statute's "affecting commerce" element. 190 As a result, jurisdiction has dominated federal litigation in the
area, with reported opinions focusing on whether the church that was
torched also ran a day care center, l9 ' whether it broadcast its services on
188. In June 1996, the New York Times ran a detailed series on the subject, focusing on
three church arsons in particular. Robyn Meredith, North Carolina: Mixed Opinions
About Role of Racial Hatred, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1996, § 1, at 14; Ronald Smothers,
Alabama: Out of Ashes, Many Blessings, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1996, § 1, at 14; Emily Yellin,
Tennessee: For One Congregation, Trying to Regain a Sense of Confidence, N.Y. Times,
June 23, 1996, § 1, at 14. For a follow-up story a few months later, see Church Fires Show
Racism, A Panel Says, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1996, at A20.
189. See generally Church Arsons and Hate Crimes, U.S. Attorneys' Bulletin, Feb.
1998, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-readingroom/usab4602.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (issue devoted to National Church Arson Task
Force).
190. Congress responded with the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-155, 110 Stat. 1392 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (2000)), but that Act too requires
substantial attention to jurisdiction. For a good example, see United States v. Corum, 362
F.3d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 2004), where the chief question was whether the defendant made
anti-Semitic threats over the phone-not whether he burned the synagogue in the
incident that led to the filing of federal charges.
191. See United States v. Terry, 257 F.3d 366, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding federal
jurisdiction primarily because the church ran a not-for-profit day care center).
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local radio stations, 19 2 whether some of its members or Sunday school
materials crossed state lines, 193 or (our personal favorite) whether the
church owned a recreational vehicle. 194 Naturally, the legal consequences of any or all of these factors remain unclear; the only thing that
can safely be said is that some church arsons fall within federal jurisdic195
tion-but only some.
This is lunacy. Federalism is not an end in itself, it is a means of
ensuring proper constraints on government. Clear lines of responsibility
and political accountability advance that goal. 196 The current approach
to federalism in criminal law retards it. And to no discernible good end:
1 97
In a world with 11,000 FBI agents and 700,000 local police officers,
there is no danger that the federal government will trample on the interests of state and local governments in punishing crime. There is a danger
that federal agents and prosecutors will freelance, advancing their own
reputations and careers at the expense of the system's goals. Both Brogan's "plain language" approach to substantive crime definition and the
jurisdiction fetish we have seen since United States v. Lopez' 98 actually increase that danger. Crimes are more broadly defined and less transparent than they otherwise would be, and litigation focuses more on jurisdiction than on the conduct and intent elements thatjustify criminalization.
If fostering enforcement accountability is the goal, the approach of
the church arson cases is completely backward. Better to say that, in areas where federal officials have assumed primary responsibility for law
enforcement, jurisdictional restraints should be relaxed, not tightened. At
the margin, that would tend to steer federal prosecutors toward areas
where federal criminal law enforcement is most socially useful. If the
crime is plausibly within the scope of some Article I federal power-and,
by the standards applied outside criminal law, all crimes are plausibly
192. See United States v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229, 234 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding federal
jurisdiction in part because the church broadcast its services on local radio); cf. United
States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that most church arsons
would not give rise to federal jurisdiction, and posing the question whether burning of
"mega-churches" might lead to a different result).
193. See Rayborn, 312 F.3d at 234-35 (noting, in support of federal jurisdiction, that
some churchgoers may have crossed state lines); Terry, 257 F.3d at 373 (King, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that interstate contacts including the receipt of
Sunday school materials from another state were sufficient to establish federal
jurisdiction).
194. This is one of the facts cited in support of federal jurisdiction by the Sixth Circuit
in Rayborn, 312 F.3d at 235.
195. Not most, according to a Ninth Circuit panel. See Lamont, 330 F.3d at 1255
(noting that "the ordinary activities of a church do not affect interstate commerce, or
indeed commerce at all").
196. The Supreme Court understands this point, at least sometimes. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (noting diminished accountability when citizens
cannot easily determine which level of government is responsible for a particular
regulatory decision).
197. See sources cited supra notes 91-92.
198. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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within the scope of one or another federal power-and if local officials
do not regularly prosecute it ("things that other people just don't
do"),199 federal jurisdiction should be as broad as possible. Where jurisdictional elements already exist, they should be given the most liberal
possible construction, in order to steer litigation toward more productive
channels. Meanwhile, statutory interpretation should focus less on plain
language arguments and more on the kind of open-ended criminal justice policy arguments that, not so long ago, dominated judicial opinions
in this area. And more on raising the cost of prosecuting "detour" crimes
like false statements and mail fraud, in order to push prosecutors away
from those crimes and toward the offenses that motivated their investigations. Finally, courts and Congress alike need to encourage truth in labeling for criminal statutes, so that fraud statutes punish fraud, bribery statutes punish bribery, and no statutes punish everything under the sun.
Not so that defendants are treated better, but so that federal law enforcers can know their job, and voters can see how well or poorly they do it.
Broad jurisdiction would have another information-forcing effect:
Federal law enforcement officials would have to publicly say where they
are putting their resources and, critically, where they are not-without
using uncertain jurisdiction as an excuse. That might make federal enforcement decisions both more transparent and more predictable.
Which, in turn, would allow local officials to make better decisions about
the allocation of their resources. This kind of institutional politics-based
federalism is likely to protect state and local prerogatives better, over
time, than any judicial construction of the Commerce Clause.
One more issue needs addressing. Federal sentencing doctrine contributes to the pretext problem. Inflated sentences for detour crimes (by
any reasonable measure, most federal sentences are inflated) encourage
prosecutors to charge those crimes instead of the offenses that prompted
their investigations. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines' "relevant conduct" or "real offense" orientation makes that problem worse. 20 0 The
Guidelines were designed to promote sentencing according to all the defendant's criminal conduct, not just the conduct that generated criminal
liability.20 1 Real offense sentencing acts as a kind of subsidy of pretextual
charging: Prosecutors can charge crime X and have the defendant sentenced based on crimes X, Y, and Z-even when crime X is fairly small
and crimes Y and Z are very large. That makes criminal litigation less
transparent and criminal charges more strategic.
199. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
200. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ lAI.1, 1B1.3 (2004); Rachel E.
Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 93-94 (2003).
201. For a good description and critical analysis, see generally David Yellen, Illusion,
Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78
Minn. L. Rev. 403 (1993).
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At first blush, the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v.
Booker2 ° 2 seems to reinforce that state of affairs. Justice Breyer's opinion
(one of the two majority opinions in Booker) includes a long hymn of
praise to real offense sentencing. 20 3 Preserving judges' right to sentence
based on uncharged conduct appears to have been a central motivation
behind Breyer's reconfigured Guidelines. 20 4 But the reconfiguration
may lead to consequences different from (and, in our view, better than)
those its author intended.
Breyer's opinion in Booker converts the Guidelines into, well, guidelines-not mandatory rules. Sentencing judges are free to vary from
Guidelines sentencing ranges, subject to appellate review under a soft
"reasonableness standard. '20 5 What that means in practice depends on
how federal judges exercise their new-found sentencing discretion-and
on Congress's willingness to stay its legislative hand. Discretion might be
used to reduce excessive sentences for detour crimes. It might also be
used to scale back sentences in cases where the gap between charged conduct and uncharged conduct is especially large: where only minor crimes
are proved, while major offenses lie in the background. If those two
things happen and if courts of appeals affirm the relevant sentences, we
might see the emergence of sentencing law that is both less harsh and
more transparent. Booker could end up advancing the cause of effective,
politically accountable federal law enforcement.
That cause, in turn, may be the key to bringing federal sentences
down to reasonable levels. One reason Congress feels free to pass harsh
sentencing rules is that those rules cost little. Most federal crimes are
rarely, if ever, enforced. Consequently, when they pass some new federal
crime or sentencing enhancement, members of Congress might reasonably believe the new rule will apply only to a handful of cases. That does
not promote responsible lawmaking. If federal sentences were more
transparent and if a larger slice of federal criminal law enforcement dealt
with cases for which federal officials have primary responsibility-so that
congressional drafters know when drafting sentencing rules that the rules
will be frequently applied-Congress would likely draft more reasonable
sentencing rules. Over time, federal sentencing law would become less a
vehicle for political posturing and more a means of defining punishments
that fit the relevant federal crimes.

202. No. 04-104, 2005 WL 50108 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005).
203. See id. at *19 (opinion of Breyer, J.) ("Congress' basic statutory goal-a system
that diminishes sentencing disparity-depends for its success upon judicial efforts to
determine, and to base punishment upon, the real conduct that underlies the crime of
conviction." (emphasis in original)).
204. See id. at *20 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (discussing examples of sentencing disparity
based on uncharged conduct that would result if the Court were to require jury findings of
Guidelines sentencing factors).
205. Id. at *26 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
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CONCLUSION

Pretextual prosecutions like the one that nailed Al Capone are indeed a problem, but not for the reasons generally supposed. The troubling part has little to do with fairness to defendants and much to do with
the challenge such tactics pose to the system's ability to police the police-to monitor the government's efforts to combat crime. Actually, the
problem is smaller than that: The federal government is where the worry
arises; political and other forces do a pretty good job of controlling local
police and prosecutors.
As to that smaller problem, there is reason to hope that things may
work out, if not optimally, at least tolerably well. The key is political accountability. The federal law enforcement system will never have the accountability of its local counterparts. Federal officials are appointed, not
elected. The issues on which their political masters rise and fall are usually not related to crime. And it is hard (though, as we have seen, not
impossible) for federal crimes to carry the same immediacy as a body in
the street or a battered victim. Even so, federal officials can be held to a
far greater degree of responsibility than they have faced for the past three
quarters of a century. Whatever its faults, one large and important virtue
of the War on Terror is that it makes that goal more achievable. Other
political forces are working in the same direction. The result may be,
over time, fewer Al Capones-and better federal law enforcement.
The biggest fly in the ointment has to do with substantive law. The
overexpansion of the federal criminal code and the current judicial obsession with the bounds of federal criminal jurisdiction, taken together,
invite pretextual enforcement. Federal crimes need narrowing, and federal jurisdiction needs broadening-two needs that seem at odds but actually reinforce one another. If both of those things happen in the years
to come, we may finally witness the emergence of something America has
never had: a functioning criminaljustice system, with boundaries between
its various police and prosecutorial agencies drawn according to principles of political responsibility and comparative advantage. That would
help solve the pretext problem. It would also make American criminal
justice more democratic, and more just.
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